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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
By 
Jason James Delaney 
July 2010 
Committee Chair: Dr. James C. Cox 
Major Department: Economics 
The chapters of this dissertation examine efficiency failures in three areas of 
applied microeconomics: experimental economics, public finance, and game theory. In 
each case, we look at ways to resolve these failures to promote the public good. 
The first chapter, ―An Experimental Test of the Pigovian Hypothesis,‖ looks at 
two different policies designed to reduce congestion in a common-pool resource (CPR). 
The predictive power of game-theoretic results with respect to an optimal subsidy in a 
common-pool resource game remains an open question. We present an experiment with 
training and a simplified decision task, allowing more tractable computerized CPR 
experiments. We find that subject behavior converges to the Nash prediction over a 
number of periods. A Pigovian subsidy effectively moves subject behavior to the pre-
subsidy social optimum. Finally, we find a significant but non-persistent effect of 
information provision in moving subjects toward the social optimum. 
The second chapter, ―Apples to Apples to Oranges,‖ looks at efficiency and 
equity failures across states resulting from public expenditure. The literature on fiscal 
equalization and horizontal equity has established that measures of fiscal capacity should 
be complemented by measures of fiscal need: the ability of a sub-national government to 
 xi 
provide services given an average level of revenue. This chapter introduces an extension 
of the Representative Expenditure System that uses regression methods and both state 
and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level data, allowing for comparability of input 
costs, service requirements, and levels of need. The regression-based results are robust 
across state- and MSA-level formulations, although state-level approaches overestimate 
need for larger, less populous states. All regression-based results diverge from previous 
workload-based approaches. 
The third chapter, ―Evading Nash Traps in Two-Player Simultaneous Games,‖ 
looks at efficiency failures in two-player simultaneous games. In some important games, 
Nash equilibrium selects Pareto-inferior equilibrium profiles. Empirically, Nash 
equilibrium sometimes performs poorly when predicting actual behavior. Previous 
approaches rely on repetition or external correlation to support efficient outcomes in 
simultaneous games. This chapter presents two new concepts: ―détente‖ and ―no-
initiative,‖ in which players consider their own strategies and other-best-responses. We 
discuss their efficiency and descriptive properties across a set of simultaneous games. 
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Chapter I: An Experimental Test of the Pigovian Hypothesis 
Introduction 
Many of the most important policy questions of our time relate not to privately 
consumed goods, but to the unintended consequences of consumption of goods, broadly 
referred to as externalities. Carbon emissions, obesity, and the stability of financial 
firms—they all have consequences that extend beyond those involved in making the 
economic decisions. A classic model to describe externalities is that of the common-pool 
resource (CPR), and a classic solution to the problem of externalities is a Pigovian tax or 
subsidy. The theoretical implications of consumption of a CPR by self-interested agents 
are straightforward, but the robustness of those results is less clear. This paper addresses 
several related issues: first, the literature has presented mixed results with respect to the 
performance of the self-interested Nash equilibrium in predicting subject behavior. 
Second, this paper presents an experimental test of the use of a Pigovian subsidy to 
induce socially optimal behavior. Finally, we ask whether, given the economic and 
political costs of introducing such a policy, there are other, nonmonetary ways to induce 
socially preferred behavior. 
This paper introduces a laboratory limited-access CPR experiment designed to 
test the theory and examine potential policies to achieve improvements in governing 
common-pool resources. Our experiment offers important contributions to: the public 
finance literature by testing the theory of Pigovian taxation; the social preferences 
literature by presenting data on the comparative results of two different policy tools—
price-based incentives and informational appeals; and the field of experimental design, in 
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that it presents a simple design making common-pool resources more tractable for future 
experimental analysis.  
In general, the literature has had a mixed response with respect to an important 
question: does self-interested Nash equilibrium predict subject behavior toward an open- 
or limited-access CPR? In their baseline experiment, Ostrom et al. (1994) (OGW) find 
that subjects appropriate from a CPR at a suboptimal level—there is congestion—but that 
subjects’ observed choices do not achieve a stable equilibrium. Walker et al. (1990) find 
that the subjects over-consume by more than the Nash prediction, while Budescu et al. 
(1995) also find that subjects over-consume, but by less than the Nash prediction. Bru et 
al. (2003) find that even strategically irrelevant factors affect behavior. Rodriguez-Sickert 
et al. (2008) present a CPR game with fines and find that even low fines have high 
deterrence power, and that a fine which is voted down nonetheless establishes a norm. 
Velez et al. (2009) find that subjects balance self-interest with conformity when selecting 
strategies. Cox et al. (2009) find that first movers’ choices in a common property version 
of the investment game are more likely to increase the size of the pie—and efficiency—
than in the private property version; neither version accords with the Nash prediction. 
This lack of consensus in the previous literature is perhaps unsurprising. In 
environments with pure private goods and institutions of impersonal exchange, Nash 
equilibrium under the assumption of self-interested agents does an excellent—but not 
perfect—job of predicting behavior. This is in contrast to the line of research concerning 
pure public goods, following, among others, Isaac and Walker (1988), and Marwell and 
Ames (1979). The deviations from the self-interested Nash equilibrium have been so 
ubiquitous and persistent in public goods games and games of personal exchange that it 
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has led to the flourishing of the other-regarding preferences literature (Isaac and Walker 
2003). 
Perhaps theory and behavior diverge due to other-regarding preferences. The 
effects of these preferences on both predicted behavior and optimal policy depend greatly 
upon how the utility or consumption of others is incorporated into one’s own preferences. 
In the cases of pure and impure (or ―warm-glow‖) altruism, for example, the optimal 
Pigovian tax will be the same as in the self-regarding case, but the level of consumption 
of the CPR will differ from the Nash prediction. Paternalistic altruism, however, implies 
a higher optimal tax than the one under self-interest, because the social optimum requires 
less consumption than under the presumption of self-interest (Johansson 1997)
1
.  
Another reason equilibrium predictions might fail could be the difficulties present 
in modeling the situation experimentally. In practice, creating congestion in an 
experimental setting presents a formidable task, particularly in a framework that allows 
simple testing of a Pigovian subsidy. This problem derives from the fact that congestion 
requires a nonlinearity in payoffs such that total social payoff peaks and declines at an 
overcongested—and privately optimal—level of consumption. This has the side effect of 
reducing the incentive to think very hard about it at the margin, because the marginal 
return to social payoff is closest to zero at the social optimum and the marginal private 
return is closest to zero at the overcongested level of consumption. Because of the payoff 
structure, determining the optimal strategy can be difficult, which may cause Nash 
                                                 
1
 Briefly, the intuition for pure altruism derives from the assumption that the utility from own-consumption 
is ―larger‖ than the external utility effect through altruism, and for large populations, the difference in the 
tax approaches zero. For impure altruism, there is merely an additional utility advantage to reducing own-
consumption, but the difference between private and social impact is unchanged. In the case of paternalistic 
altruism, marginal damages are increased by the extent of the paternalism, and the tax should thus be 
higher. 
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predictions to perform poorly. If subjects are confused or frustrated, they may simply 
(and rationally) decide not to think too hard about it. In one treatment, OGW allow (and 
record) communication, and note that in some of their experiments, this lack of 
dominance appears to be a problem. When CPR consumption increased in one period, the 
group members tried to determine whether greed or error was to blame, and one member 
noted that a defector would have earned ―Just a few darn cents above the rest of us.‖  
The predictive power of Nash equilibria with respect to CPR games directly 
affects the theoretical efficacy of Pigovian taxation or subsidies as a means to achieving 
efficiency. One of the earliest and simplest solutions to congestion under an open- or 
limited-access property regime, the Pigovian hypothesis has, to our knowledge, never 
been tested experimentally. Pigou (1920) hypothesized that, to offset congestion, an 
optimal tax or subsidy could be applied to internalize the congestion externality—
essentially altering the game so that the socially optimal outcome of the CPR is the Nash 
equilibrium outcome of the modified system. If the Nash equilibrium strategy profile fails 
to predict behavior in a CPR game, it is unclear what to expect from a Pigovian subsidy. 
Finally, the costs of monitoring and enforcement—be they technical or political—
required to implement and maintain a Pigovian scheme are often prohibitive. To the 
extent that people are motivated by non-monetary factors—other-regarding preferences, 
conformity and other social norms, or merely cognitive difficulty—it may be possible to 
reduce deadweight welfare loss through non-monetary means.  
In order to try to minimize dominance effects, the present experiment reduces the 
complexity of the payoff function, provides an intuitive interface and response mode, and 
provides training and software-assisted payoff calculation. The aim is to reduce the 
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cognitive costs of decision-making to allow a sharper test of the Nash equilibrium 
prediction in this CPR game. This experiment provides evidence that subjects’ choices 
converge, but that it takes some time to reach the predicted outcome. 
To date, there has been incidental evidence with respect to the performance of a 
Pigovian subsidy in achieving the intended outcome, but there has been no direct test of 
the theory. This experiment presents an experimental test of the Pigovian hypothesis; the 
experimental results fit well with the theoretical prediction—Pigou was correct. A second 
treatment in this paper presents subjects with information on the social optimum as a test 
for the effect of such information on subjects’ behavior. We find a small and non-
persistent effect, but further experimental study is warranted to determine the feasibility 
of information provision as a means of improving efficiency. 
The paper is set up as follows: The next section presents the basic model of a 
limited-access CPR that we use in this experiment. Section 2 presents the experimental 
design, the hypotheses, and the statistical approach. Section 3 presents the results and a 
discussion and Section 4 presents some concluding comments. 
Theory 
The theory of limited-access common-pool resources is a standard in public 
finance, and environmental, urban and regional economics. The intuition derives from a 
difference between the marginal private benefit (MPB) or cost (MPC) from consumption, 
and the marginal social benefit (MSB) or cost (MSC) of consumption—an externality. 
Assuming MPB > MSB and MPC = MSC, for example, the marginal social cost at 
equilibrium will be greater than the marginal social benefit, and the socially optimal 
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quantity will be less than the equilibrium quantity. Pigou asserted that there exists a 
subsidy (or tax), t*, that will induce the socially optimal quantity choice, and that t* is 
simply the difference between the net MSB and net MPB at the optimal quantity.  
The theory itself is relatively straightforward, but the design of an experimental 
framework to represent congestion has proven complicated. In general, CPR games, 
including OGW, represent the CPR using a production function approach with an 
―outside option,‖ which is a pure private good. A test of the Pigovian hypothesis can be 
implemented by increasing the opportunity cost of expenditure on the CPR, by increasing 
the private return to the outside option. In order to avoid potential subjective 
considerations surrounding subjects’ concept of taxation, as well as to avoid negative 
returns and potential effects due to prospective losses, we test the theory using a subsidy, 
rather than a tax.  
Formally, let             index individual agents. Let    represent individual i's 
endowment,   , represent i's expenditure on the CPR, and     represent total (combined) 
expenditure on CPR (including i). Let           represent the payoff from an outside 
option,           , the payoff from the CPR, and            an individual’s total payoff. 
Specify the payoff to the common pool resource by defining                         
where β is a per-token payoff to the CPR that declines with increasing consumption of 
the CPR with the γ parameter (for γ = 0, there is no congestion). Under standard 
economic assumptions, each individual is maximizing           with respect to   . In 
general, with appropriation games, there is an incentive to consume the CPR and an 
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incentive to consume the outside option. The game played in the present experiment has 
the following payoff function2: 
                                
To help subjects determine their payoffs, the software provides a payoff calculator 
that allows subjects to examine hypothetical situations before making a decision. The 
calculator is discussed further in section 2.  
This payoff function presents subjects with a fixed per-token return to the outside 
option and a declining per-token return to the CPR. In order to introduce a subsidy, we 
add an additional fixed per-token amount     to the return to the outside option. 
Proposition. Define the payoff function for individual i as:  
                                    
Without a subsidy        , the Nash equilibrium is symmetrical with each 
player choosing   
  
   
      
. 
For        , the social optimum occurs when each player chooses   
  
   
   
. 
The socially optimal level of consumption and the Nash equilibrium level of consumption 
are only identical for n = 1 or β = α.3 
For      , the strategy at the Nash equilibrium becomes   
  
     
      
, and the 
optimal Pigovian subsidy is          
   
  
 .4 
                                                 
2
 This is similar, but not identical, to the payoff function used in OGW (although the solutions are the 
same). In particular, OGW use an approach where each subject earns a share of quasi-linear production in 
the CPR, in which the framing and the functional form are presented to the subjects. We use a per-token 
approach, explained as such, which seems more transparent, and requires no facility with exponents to 
figure out one’s own payoff.  
3
 These represent two trivial cases: the case of individual use, in which there is no externality, and the case 
of an outside option that dominates the CPR. 
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The incentives governing the marginal decision to consume the CPR warrant a 
brief discussion. Unlike linear VCM games, the marginal per-capita return (MPCR) is not 
constant in this game. Consider a unit increase in the consumption of the CPR (implying 
a unit decrease in consumption of the outside option), and where    represents the current 
level of CPR consumption. The MPCR to oneself (which is the previously discussed 
MPB) from consuming an additional unit of the CPR is              –     
    –     . The MPCR to others varies across individuals, proportional with their level of 
consumption of the CPR, and is equal to –     for each individual, where   indexes other 
individuals. This is straightforward: each unit of CPR consumption carries a variable 
benefit, which is            for the       
th
 unit, carries an opportunity cost in the 
form of a forgone return to the outside option,        , and reduces the value of all 
previous consumption of the CPR by  , which decreases own-payoff by     (fishing or 
driving congests own-consumption as well), and decreases other payoffs by     for each 
k in the group. Except for the case where no one else is currently consuming the CPR, 
one’s own consumption of the CPR unambiguously reduces others’ payoffs: MSB < 
MPB for      . 
                                                                                                                                                 
4
 For the purposes of this experiment, we are abstracting away from the source of the subsidy and possible 
distortionary effects in raising the required revenue. It should be noted that the theory postulated by Pigou 
is not complete in this respect, as it does not posit a budget balancing constraint—the taxes go nowhere and 
the subsidies come from nowhere. This is typical in tax theory in a partial equilibrium framework, and in 
practice, it seems unlikely that people are aware of the total effect of every dollar they receive as a subsidy 
or dollar they pay in taxes. In addition, a number of other mechanisms for achieving efficiency rely on 
abandonment of budget balancing; the Clarke tax and the Groves-Ledyard mechanism are two important 
examples 
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Protocol 
Because the impact of social norms and framing seems non-trivial, we avoid 
terminology like ―common-pool resource,‖ ―extraction,‖ ―appropriation,‖ ―tax,‖ 
―subsidy,‖ etc. We follow Andreoni and Petrie (2004) in presenting the decision they face 
as an ―investment‖ decision in which they will decide how to invest a number of tokens 
in each period. Subjects are given the choice to invest their tokens in the outside option or 
the CPR, which are referred to in the experiment as the ―RED investment‖ and the 
―BLUE investment,‖ respectively. 
We implement this model using the following parameterization: (α: per-token 
baseline RED payoff; β: per-token starting BLUE payoff; γ: per-token BLUE congestion 
parameter; δ: per-token RED subsidy; z: period endowment; n: group size) = ($0.00, 
$0.36, $0.01, $0.12, 10, 3). These parameters were chosen for a number of reasons. In 
particular, they guarantee a unique (and symmetric) interior Nash equilibrium in both the 
baseline and the subsidy treatments (    and    , respectively). They also provide 
enough distance between the two equilibria for statistical inference. In addition, the 
differences are economically significant. Under the socially optimal outcome, subjects 
would earn $26.88; the per-subject payment under the Nash equilibrium outcome is 
$22.26. The minimum possible payoff is $0.00 for the information treatment and $4.20 
for the subsidy treatment. The maximum possible payoff is $54.60 under both conditions. 
Finally, the group size is such that off-Nash behavior might reasonably be sustained, as 
implicit collusion is easier with smaller groups. If Nash cannot be rejected, it seems likely 
that it would predict well for larger groups. 
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This analysis has relied on continuity and differentiability to determine Nash 
results. In practice, it is not generally true that a unique Nash equilibrium in the 
continuous case implies a unique equilibrium in a discrete implementation (Swarthout 
and Walker 2009). In order to ensure that these continuous results hold for the 
implementation we use in the experiment, we tested every strategy profile under the 
parameters and find that there is indeed a unique (and symmetric) interior Nash 
equilibrium in both the baseline case                      and the subsidy case 
                    .  
The experiment was conducted in two sessions at Georgia State University’s 
Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN). In each session there were 24 subjects, 
randomly separated into 8 groups of 3.
5
 Each session lasted about an hour and a half. 
Individual earnings, including a $5 show-up payment, ranged from $17.98 to $40.60.  
The sessions were run with a double-blind protocol. Our primary research 
questions concern individual behavior under induced preferences, as well as those 
preferences they might have regarding the welfare of anonymous members of their group. 
In addition, the information treatment looks at information provision without a direct 
appeal to social norms. There is some experimental evidence that with less than strict 
anonymity, the domain of other-regarding preferences may expand beyond the group 
(see, for example, Hoffman et al. (1994), Cox and Deck (2006), and Andreoni and Petrie 
(2004)). Relaxing anonymity to observe CPR consumption decisions in the presence of 
external subjective norms is another straightforward extension of the present experiment. 
                                                 
5
 In the first session, a student asked to leave after subjects had been signed in and placed in groups, but 
before the experiment began. A graduate student took his place to satisfy the requirements of the software 
and to allow the other students in his group to participate. We exclude data from that group; inclusion does 
not affect the qualitative results. 
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Strict anonymity was maintained, but in each round, all subjects were aware of 
the sum of the decisions made by the other members of their group in each previous 
round. Groups were randomly assigned, but fixed throughout the experiment. The 
experiment was computerized, and was run in an experimental lab with dividers in place 
so that subjects could not easily see one another. Each subject participated in two 
baseline treatments  and one of two experimental treatments: either the Pigovian subsidy 
treatment or the information treatment. All subjects in a given session participated in the 
same treatments. For each treatment, each individual was asked to make seven 
―investment‖ decisions. 
In each period, each token invested in the RED investment paid a fixed per-token 
amount. Each token invested in the BLUE investment paid a per-token amount that 
depended upon the total number of tokens invested in the BLUE investment by the group. 
Each session consisted of two treatments, administered in B-A-B format, so that each 
session consisted of a baseline treatment, an experimental treatment, and a second 
baseline treatment. Subjects knew the number of periods, but were not made aware ahead 
of time when treatments would begin or end. Because of the relative complexity of the 
payoff structure as well as an established downward trend, or ―decay,‖ in group 
contributions, widely documented in public goods games (Isaac and Walker 1988, for 
example), providing a second baseline allows us to observe, and perhaps account for, any 
such trends when trying to discern a treatment effect. 
In the baseline periods in both sessions, tokens invested in the RED investment 
provided a per-token payoff of $0.00. Tokens invested in the BLUE investment provided 
a per-token payoff of $0.35 for a single token. The per-token value of tokens invested in 
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the BLUE investment declined by $0.01 per token invested in BLUE under all 
experimental conditions, down to a minimum of $0.00 per token. After each period, 
subjects were informed of the total group investment in the BLUE investment, as well as 
their period payoff and their total profit. 
In the first session, the experimental treatment was the administration of a 
Pigovian subsidy. During periods 8-14, the RED token payoff was increased to $0.12. 
In the second session, the experimental treatment was the provision of 
information regarding the common pool resource. During periods 8-14, subjects were 
given the total group payoff in the previous period, the hypothetical group payoff at the 
social optimum, and an explanation of how to achieve the social optimum in the event 
that the two are unequal (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Information treatment 
Each session proceeded as follows: subjects were allowed to read the instructions 
privately; the instructions were then read aloud, verbatim. (Appendix A) After the 
instructions were completed, an example was drawn from the instructions and 
demonstrated by the experimenter on a projection of the computer interface. Subjects 
then were given a walk-through tutorial of the computer interface (Figure 2), in which 
they were allowed to select from several sets of parameters and then given the 
opportunity to practice using the software with a computer playing deterministically as 
the ―rest of the group,‖ selecting 0 tokens in the BLUE investment in the first round, 
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followed by 1 token in the second round, continuing up through 20 tokens, before 
restarting at 0 tokens. Subjects were allowed to practice this way as long as they liked. 
They chose to participate in between 0 and 42 practice rounds. 
 
Figure 2. Tutorial screenshot 
See Appendix B for screenshots of the full tutorial. 
In addition to the practice rounds, subjects had access to a payoff calculator 
throughout the tutorial and the experiment. The payoff calculator (Figure 3) allows 
subjects to choose a hypothetical decision for themselves, a hypothetical combined 
investment in the BLUE investment for the rest of the group, and provides information on 
their payoffs under the current parameters, as well as the own-payoff consequences of 
single-token changes in either direction for themselves or for the group. The practice 
periods and tutorial were intended to introduce subjects to the decision task, familiarize 
them with both the task and the interface, and provide them with an opportunity to use 
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the calculator and the interface before making decisions for real payoffs. We collected 
data on the number of practice rounds each subject chose to use. 
 
Figure 3. Payoff calculator 
 
Once the experiment concluded, subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire 
while payments were prepared. This questionnaire included basic demographic data, as 
well as data on education and measures of outlook regarding trust, justice, and human 
nature. 
Hypotheses 
The primary hypotheses of interest are as follows (  indicates mean): 
1. The Nash equilibrium outcome is a good predictor of subjects’ choices: 
              
 . 
2. The Pigovian subsidy has the theoretically predicted effect:           
           
 , where    is the mean investment in the CPR at the pre-subsidy social 
optimum. 
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3. The presentation of information has no effect:                         . 
If subjects express other-regarding preferences—particularly pure, impure, or 
paternalistic altruism—we should expect 1 and 2 to fail. In particular, if other-payoff 
enters positively into the utility function, we should expect               
  and 
                     
 . 
If subjects are intending to express other-regarding preferences, but making errors 
in the attempt, the provision of information on the group payoff in addition to 
information on their own payoff would allow them to change their investment decisions 
to more accurately represent their preferences. If they possess an external norm that 
indicates that, given an opportunity to make the group better off at one’s own expense, 
one ought to take such an opportunity, provision of information on the group’s total 
payoff provides both a reminder of the relevance of the choice task to group welfare and 
information on how to improve group welfare at one’s own expense. Finally, if 
information acts as a coordination point, even self-interested agents might strategically 
coordinate on a point that would give them higher payoffs with the hope of either 
sustaining a higher level of earnings or reneging in the future. Consequently, if subjects 
are either prone to errors, have norms that are not fully internalized, or are prone to 
strategic coordination, we should expect to see                         .  
In addition, we test a number of other hypotheses regarding subsets of the data to 
try to get a more accurate picture of subject behavior. We also consider other questions, 
including the source and causes of deviations from Nash strategy, as well as concerns 
regarding censoring, using more parametric estimation techniques. 
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Results 
As previously mentioned, in both treatments the first seven rounds were baseline 
rounds, as were the last seven rounds, with the intervening seven rounds presenting 
experimental treatments. We report the results discursively; statistical test results are 
presented in Table 1 and indexed by hypothesis being tested (e.g. H1, H2, …). In the 
table, ―Baseline 1‖ refers to periods 1-7, ―Baseline 2‖ refers to periods 15-21, and 
―Baseline‖ without a number refers to the combined results from Baseline 1 and Baseline 
2. In addition, unless otherwise specified, the variable of interest in this section is the 
across-period mean CPR investment decision by a given subject, paired when 
appropriate. This approach accounts for both individual and group fixed effects.  
The sessions differ significantly (H1: p = 0.000, Figure 4). The mean baseline 
investment in the CPR in Session 1 was 8.803 tokens, while the mean baseline 
investment in Session 2 was 7.964 tokens. The null that these are equal can be rejected. 
In addition, there is evidence of either learning or a ―decay‖-type trend (probably both). 
In the first session, baseline 1 mean investment in the CPR was 8.517 (SE = 0.126) 
tokens while the baseline 2 mean investment was 9.088 (SE = 0.063) tokens. Again, we 
can reject the null of equality (H2: p = 0.010). In the second session, the baseline 1 mean 
investment was 7.452 (SE = 0.200) tokens, while the baseline 2 mean investment was 
8.476 (SE = 0.125) tokens. Once again, we can reject the null that these observations are 
drawn from the same distribution. (H3: p = 0.003). 
Figure 5 presents the mean decision by period in the first session. In the first 
session baseline periods, we cannot reject the null that subjects’ behavior accorded with 
the Nash prediction, on average (H4: p = 0.388). The subsidy, in addition, seems to have   
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Table 1. Statistical tests of hypotheses and robustness checks 
Hypothesis Reject? Wilcoxon test K-S Test
6
 
H1: Session 1 Baseline = 
Session 2 Baseline 
Reject rank-sum  
Z = 3.665, p = 0.002 
D = 0.4464,  
p = 0.017 
H2: Session 1 Baseline 1 = 
Session 1 Baseline 2 
Reject matched-pairs sign-rank  
Z = -2.575, p = 0.010 
D = 0.5238,  
p = 0.006 
H3: Session 2 Baseline 1 = 
Session 2 Baseline 2 
Reject matched-pairs sign-rank  
Z = -3.002, p = 0.003 
D = 0.3333,  
p = 0.093 
H4: Session 1 Baseline = 9 Cannot reject sign-rank  
Z=-0.863, p =0.388 
 
H5: Session 1 Treatment = 6 Cannot reject sign-rank  
Z=-0.233, p =0.816 
 
H6: Session 1 Baseline = 
Session 1 Treatment 
Reject matched-pairs sign-rank  
Z = -3.002, p = 0.000 
D = 0.857, 
p = 0.000 
H7: Session 2 Baseline = 9 Reject sign-rank  
Z=-6.714, p =0.000 
 
H8: Session 2 Baseline = 
Session 2 Treatment 
Cannot reject matched-pairs sign-rank 
Z = 0.729, p = 0.466 
D = 0.125, 
p = 0.975 
H9: Session 2 Baseline 2 = 
Session 2 Treatment 
Reject matched-pairs sign-rank 
Z = 3.211, p = 0.001 
D = 0.25, 
p = 0.347 
H10: Session 2 Mid-Baseline = 
Session 2 Treatment 
Marginal rejection matched-pairs sign-rank  
Z = 1.416, p = 0.157 
D = 0.1667, 
p = 0.815 
H11: Session 2 Baseline 2 = 
Session 2 Treatment 
(detrended) 
Cannot reject matched-pairs sign-rank 
Z = 0.743, p = 0.458 
D = 0.1667, 
p = 0.820 
H12: Session 2 Mid-Baseline = 
Session 2 Treatment 
(detrended) 
Cannot reject matched-pairs sign-rank  
Z = 0.972, p = 0.331 
D = 0.1667, 
p = 0.834 
H13: Session 2 Baseline = 
Session 2 Period 8 
Reject matched-pairs sign-rank  
Z = 2.258, p = 0.024 
D = 0.375, 
p = 0.047 
H14: Session 2 Mid-Baseline = 
Session 2 Period 8 
Reject matched-pairs sign-rank  
Z = 2.733, p = 0.006 
D = 0.417, 
p = 0.020 
H15: Session 2 Baseline = 9 
(random-effect tobit 
model) 
Cannot reject Wald test 
      = 0.02, p = 0.896 
 
                                                 
6
 Where appropriate, we use a boot-strapped (10,000 iteration) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of 
distributions for distribution tests, which does not incorporate matching, but has the nice property of being 
able to test against discrete distributions. (See Sekhon, forthcoming) We use this test as a robustness check. 
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Figure 4. Mean BLUE investment by period by session 
(NE line indicates Nash equilibrium prediction without subsidy) 
 
Figure 5. Investment decisions by period, Subsidy Session 
treatment
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1 7 14 21
Period
decision (no tax) decision (tax)
mean decision by period
D
e
c
is
io
n
19 
 
the effect posited by Pigou (H5: p = 0.816). Subjects’ mean investment in the CPR was 
5.946 (SE = 0.154) tokens, which is not significantly different from the Pigovian 
prediction of 6 tokens. We can reject the null of no treatment effect; this is robust to using 
the first, the second, or the combined baseline treatment as a basis for comparison (H6: p 
= 0.000). 
Because of the existence of an underlying time trend, two approaches were used 
to try to separate the effects of learning and decay from the treatment effect. The first is 
to use as a basis of comparison only those periods which are most like those of the 
treatment group in terms of learning and decay—namely, the last three of the first 
baseline and the first four of the second baseline, which we will refer to as the ―mid-
baseline.‖ Using the mid-baseline has a few advantages: we expect some of the noise of 
experimentation and learning has dissipated by period 5, while these periods do not 
contain the same level of decay as the last three periods.  
The second attempt requires the assumption of a linear trend that is stationary 
throughout the session. Elimination of this trend was done by simple OLS regression of 
the subjects’ investment decisions on the period, and then subtraction of this period-based 
component to produce a de-trended decision. For the subsidy treatment session, neither 
method has a qualitative effect on the magnitude or significance of this treatment effect. 
For the second session, we can reject the null that pooled baseline behavior is 
equal to the Nash prediction (H7: p = 0.000), and subjects’ investment decisions appear to 
be noisier and converge later than do those in the first session (Figure 6). The effect of 
the information they receive is more difficult to discern. The mean contribution decision 
during the information treatment was 7.833 (SE = 0.163) tokens, and indeed, we cannot 
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reject the null of equality with the baseline mean (H8: p = 0.466). Considering the 
dispersion of decisions in the first several periods of this session, however, other tests 
seem appropriate. Comparing the treatment periods only to the second baseline, for 
example, produces a paired test that recommends rejecting the null of equality (H9). 
Because the treatment precedes this second baseline, it appears that the underlying time-
trend may confound the result. Both methods to account for the time-trend in the first 
session were also used for the second session. 
 
Figure 6. Investment decisions by period, Information Session 
The mean contribution in the mid-baseline periods was 8.125 (SE = 0.162), which 
is marginally different than that of the treatment group (H10). The mean de-trended 
decision in the session was 7.127 (SE = 0.117) tokens in the CPR. Use of the de-trended 
version removes any significant difference between the second baseline and the treated 
group or the mid-baseline and the treated group (H11, H12). 
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A sharp decline in contributions is visible in Figure 6 during period 8, the first 
period of the treatment (mean contribution to the CPR = 6.750, SE = 0.494). 
Nonparametric tests indicate that this is indeed significantly different from the full 
baseline, as well as the mid-baseline, and that these results persist even in the de-trended 
data (H13, H14). 
It is unclear that an assumption of a linear trend is a legitimate one, so while the 
tests for the de-trended data are illustrative, they may not be conclusive. A more 
sophisticated test for an effect of information can be developed by considering the nature 
of the treatment: in particular, subjects may see one of three different types of message. 
For subjects in groups that under-invest in the CPR, they are informed that an increase in 
their level of investment would increase the payoff to the group. For those in groups at 
the social optimum, they are informed that their current level of investment is optimal. 
Finally, for those in groups suffering from overcongestion in the CPR, subjects are 
informed that a reduction in investment would lead to an increase in group payoff. It may 
be the case that the information is having an effect, but that offsetting behavior leads to 
an inability to reject the null of no effect, because the changes preserve the mean level of 
investment within subjects. 
In practice, of the 168 messages subjects received during the information 
treatment, 147 informed subjects that a decrease would improve group payoff, 9 informed 
subjects that an increase would improve group payoff, and 12 informed subjects that they 
were at the maximum group payoff. Consequently, 12.5% of the messages sent to 
subjects would not be expected to induce a reduction in CPR investment. Considering the 
subset of subjects who received a message related to a decrease in CPR investment 
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should allow a better test of a treatment effect. Consider this ―sub-treatment‖ the 
―Decrease‖ treatment. 
Selection of the counterfactual is important in this case. Those who received the 
Decrease treatment are similar in known ways. First, these are subjects in the Information 
session. Second, the decisions under the treatment occur during the middle seven periods. 
Finally, only those who were members of groups whose combined investment in the 
previous period exceeded the socially optimal level of investment received advice to 
decrease their investment. For a basis of comparison, we can consider decisions that meet 
the first and third criteria as ―candidates for treatment.‖ 
Considering all periods in session 2, we cannot reject the null of no effect of the 
Decrease treatment (Table 2). When comparing against the mid-baseline, we can reject 
the null of no effect at the 10% level. In both cases, these hypothesis tests are 
unconditional and, as we are using mean levels of investment by subject, we have 24 
observations. Using regression methods, we may be able to account for censoring and 
improve statistical power. 
Table 2. Tests of the effect of the Decrease treatment 
Matched-pair 
sign-rank test 
Session 2 only  Session 2 mid-
baseline  
Treatment  
Mean 
(SD) 
8.070 
(1.508)  
8.178 
(1.638)  
7.846 
(1.657)  
Z  1.001 1.753   
p  0.317  0.080   
 
In this case, again, selection of the counterfactual is important. In order to 
increase the power of the test, some of the regressions include data from both sessions. 
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Table 3 presents the results for selected regressions. Those observations that are 
considered ―candidates‖ from session 1, under the ―Full‖ subset of the data, are those 
investment decisions for which the group decision in the previous period exceeded the 
social optimum and the price level was the same as in the information treatment in both 
the preceding period and the period in which the decision was made. The reported results 
are robust to modifications in the chosen counterfactual set of observations. 
In addition to tests of the average effect of the Decrease treatment over the seven-
period treatment, the regressions include specifications using only the first 8 periods of 
session 2 (the results labeled ―One-shot‖ in the ―Data subset‖ row), which provides a test 
of the effect of the Decrease treatment on first sight. This ―first-sight‖ effect is always 
significant at the 10% level. Subjects’ observed choices declined significantly the first 
time they received the Decrease treatment. 
The effect of the Decrease treatment is always negative and generally significant, 
so this particular form of information provision appears to have a small negative effect on 
investment in the CPR that spikes in subjects’ first exposure, reducing investment levels 
on average by a little over a single token, but which does not persist through subsequent 
periods. It is smaller than the effect of the Pigovian subsidy, but is perhaps surprisingly 
large, given that there is no direct appeal to social norms nor any communication allowed 
among subjects. These results represent a roughly 9% increase in subjects’ single-period 
earnings as a result of the first exposure to the Decrease treatment, indicating that there 
may be greater efficiency gains possible without requiring a costly intervention such as a 
tax or subsidy. 
  
 
2
4
 
Table 3. Regression results under different specifications 
Dependent variable is number of tokens invested in the CPR 
information
a
 -0.247* -0.277* -0.891* -0.188 -0.178 -1.303*** -0.249* -0.231 -1.186** -1.257* -0.422* 
 (0.089) (0.080) (0.083) (0.234) (0.321) (0.010) (0.087) (0.135) (0.044) (0.090) (0.057) 
candidate 0.654** 0.916** 0.402 0.426** 0.416* 0.326 0.720** 0.667* 0.68 0.654 1.080*** 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.205) (0.027) (0.077) (0.234) (0.018) (0.080) (0.331) (0.487) (0.000) 
subsidy -2.323*** 
  
-2.494*** 
  
-2.477*** 
   
-2.551*** 
 (0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
   
(0.000) 
period 
   
0.0570*** 0.0713*** 0.121 0.0554*** 0.0683*** 0.0562 
 
0.0590*** 
 
   
(0.000) (0.004) (0.191) (0.000) (0.000) (0.604) 
 
(0.000) 
Constant 7.830*** 7.224*** 7.163*** 7.367*** 6.817*** 6.672*** 8.021*** 7.374*** 6.869*** 7.725*** 8.369*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lags? N N N N N N Y Y Y N Y 
σu 
         
2.636*** 1.186*** 
 
         
(0.000) (0.000) 
σe 
         
2.274*** 1.500*** 
 
         
(0.000) (0.000) 
Specification Fixed-effects OLS, standard errors clustered on group 
Fixed-effects OLS, heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors 
Panel Tobit with 
bootstrapped standard 
errors 
Data subset
b
 Full Session 2 One-shot Full Session 2 One-shot Full Session 2 One-shot One-shot Full 
Observations 900 480 168 900 480 168 855 456 144 168 855 
R-squared 0.346 0.03 0.036 0.384 0.097 0.052 0.501 0.228 0.132 
  
Number of id 45 24 24 45 24 24 45 24 24 24 45 
a
 Significance of the coefficient on ―information‖ represents a test of the null hypothesis that information about a decrease in CPR investment had no effect. 
b
 ―Full‖ indicates both sessions are included with the first period omitted, as candidacy for treatment depends on lagged group decisions. ―Session 2‖ indicates 
only session 2 data is included. ―One-shot‖ indicates that data is drawn from periods 1 – 8 only. 
p-values in parentheses. *p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 
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The observed difference between sessions may be correlated with use of practice 
rounds. During the tutorial phase of the experiment, subjects had the opportunity to play 
with a deterministic computerized ―rest of the group‖ as many times as they liked. The 
median number of practice rounds for subjects in Session 1 was 3.5, while the median for 
session 2 was 1.5 (the corresponding means are 9.04 and 5.583). The two distributions 
are marginally significantly different (the Mann-Whitney test gives a p-value of 0.1215, 
but the total number of subjects is only 45), but in other observable ways, the two 
sessions appear to draw from the same population.
7
  
This seems to be borne out by the progress of subjects’ behavior over the course 
of the experiment. The mean absolute deviation from best response is, in a sense, a 
measure of the deviation from self-interested behavior, as payoffs are decreasing with 
this deviation. Figure 7 presents the mean absolute deviation from the best response over 
time: it is clear that both samples are converging over the course of the experiment—in 
the limit, to the Nash prediction—but that 21 periods are not enough to ultimately 
converge within the second session. 
If learning is a concern, we might expect the practice rounds to help subjects 
converge, and indeed there is a marginally significant effect of the number of practice 
rounds played on the mean absolute deviation from best response (p=0.058, n = 45). For 
the average subject, in terms of mean absolute deviation from best response, the effect of 
practice rounds reduces the mean absolute deviation from best response by 0.0354 tokens 
                                                 
7
 An early hypothesis for the difference in baseline behavior was a ―Friday effect,‖ as the second session 
was run on a Friday, the first on a Tuesday. This could either be due to a hypothetical change of behavior 
among subjects on Fridays or to drawing from different sets of students not in class at the time of the 
experiment— different types of classes might be held on a Tuesday/Thursday schedule, others on 
Monday/Wednesday/Friday. This second hypothetical cause of a ―Friday effect‖ does not appear to be 
detectable among observable covariates.  
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per round. With an average number of tutorial trials of 7.18 across the full sample, the 
mean effect of practice rounds reduces the mean absolute deviation from best response by 
.25 tokens, or a 15% reduction in average absolute deviation. 
 
Figure 7. Absolute deviation from best-response by period by session 
(with population means and lines of best fit) 
Conclusion 
As population continues to rise, the impact of congestion externalities continues 
to increase. Common-pool resources are increasingly policy-relevant, and while there is a 
growing literature on common-pool resource experiments, these goods still have not 
received the research attention that private and pure public goods have received. The 
reasons for this are both technical and theoretical—these goods are complicated by their 
very nature, and the institutions that govern them vary widely. This experiment presents a 
simplified common-pool resource experiment to subjects and the results indicate that 
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subjects do indeed converge to the Nash prediction under these conditions, but that 
convergence can take quite a while. 
One of the simplest (theoretically, if not practically) policy tools to correct for the 
congestion externality inherent in common-pool resources is the introduction of a 
Pigovian tax or subsidy to internalize the externality. We show that such an intervention, 
if feasible, should have the effect hypothesized by Pigou. Bearing in mind the 
impracticality or high cost of introducing such a direct intervention, we find a smaller, 
but significant effect from an information provision treatment. Further study on similar 
approaches to appeals to social norms should provide more insights into how effective 
such appeals can be at reducing congestion in common-pool resources. Ferraro (2009), 
for example, reports a large-scale randomized policy field experiment and finds that ―pro-
social‖ messages have an effect on water use. The information treatment used here 
primarily provides information, rather than appealing directly to social norms. Future 
research should look at the effect of specific appeals to social norms in reducing 
congestion in the lab. 
In addition, extending the experiment to incorporate taxes directly, allowing 
subjects to see marginal changes in both own- and other-payoff, changing group size, and 
directly modifying marginal per-capita return on investment would provide useful 
information on the sensitivity of CPR consumption decisions to these conditions. In 
particular, experiments using very large groups could be useful in extending external 
validity to more closely represent naturally occurring common-pool-resources. 
Finally, we find that subjects’ participation in practice rounds has a positive and 
significant effect on the rate of convergence to the Nash prediction. This, as well as the 
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evidence on the rate of subjects’ convergence to equilibrium, confirms that common-pool 
resource experiments are complicated, and our inference with respect to subject behavior 
should allow for a nontrivial amount of time for convergence to equilibrium.
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Chapter II: Apples to Apples to Oranges 
Fiscal Need in the United States in a Regression-Based 
Representative Expenditure Approach 
Introduction 
Fiscal need is a measure of the ability of a sub-national government (SNG) to 
provide an average level of services with an average level of revenue. The level of 
services required of U.S. states has grown over the last fifty years, without reference to 
the differing abilities of the states to keep up with these requirements.
8
 The latter half of 
the twentieth century witnessed the steady advance of minimum standards of public 
service provision, motivated both by local public choice and by federal legislation. 
Such laws, in general, have the potential to create efficiency gains. The federal 
government has the unique ability to internalize externalities at the national level, 
circumventing difficult public choice quandaries that can lead to pollution havens or 
interstate competition over fair labor standards, for example. While many programs have 
been designed and mandated at the national level, the fiscal apparatus required to 
implement them, including the primary source of funding, remains primarily a state and 
local phenomenon: national standards are not generally funded by the Federal 
Government (e.g. No Child Left Behind and the Clean Air Act). States face different 
challenges in complying with these standards. A state with a stiff wind blowing in off the 
coast may find it easier to comply with clean air standards, while a state with entrenched 
                                                 
8
 Since 1960, the share of GDP devoted to state and local public expenditure has nearly doubled from 
11.6% of GDP in 1960 to 22.2% in 2010. 
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poverty and low levels of adult education may have a difficult time improving eighth-
grade test scores. 
A common standard with heterogeneous costs and needs leads to spending 
different amounts of money to provide a mandated level of public services. Implicitly, 
this results in redistribution of net fiscal burden (NFB) across states. The fiscal 
equalization literature notes that redistribution represents an opportunity to advance both 
equity and efficiency through equalization. By the same token, service provision 
standards without consideration of fiscal need can reduce both efficiency and equity. 
The implications for policy have an upside: policy that accounts for this burden-
shifting can improve efficiency and equity by eliminating the incentive to move for fiscal 
reasons. In principle, this means equalizing the NFB for each individual across SNGs. In 
practice, the policy goal has been to provide SNGs with the ability to do so by equalizing 
―fiscal comfort,‖ or the ability of a SNG to provide an average level of services with an 
average level of tax effort, not revenue. 
Measuring fiscal comfort involves measuring two dimensions: revenue-raising 
ability, or ―fiscal capacity,‖ and service-provision ability. Measuring fiscal capacity has 
proven to be more straightforward than measuring fiscal need for practical, theoretical, 
and analytical reasons, and as a result most equalization schemes are based on tax 
equalization.
9
 This adjusts revenue as though per-capita expenditure need were constant 
within a country. When only tax treatment is accounted for in an equalization program, 
the equalization program may increase efficiency, but there remains an incentive to move 
to reduce one’s NFB, and thus allocative inefficiencies remain (Boadway and Flatters 
1982). Tax-based equalization leaves money on the table. 
                                                 
9
 Bird and Vaillancourt (2007) provide a good overview of the types of exceptions found in practice. 
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Empirical evidence indicates that ignoring fiscal need is economically significant. 
Wilson (2003) looks at Canadian migration data in response to Canada’s capacity-based 
equalization program and finds significant efficiency gains in addition to the more 
straightforward equity improvements. Shah (1996) provides evidence on the size of the 
disparity that arises from excluding fiscal need in Canada’s equalization program and 
finds that incorporating expenditure need in the measure of fiscal comfort leads to 
significant changes in the existing entitlements, nearly halving the net transfer out of 
Ontario and nearly doubling the net transfer out of British Columbia. 
Given the potential gains from a fiscal-comfort approach, why do existing policies 
generally ignore fiscal need? There are several reasons. First, the concept of fiscal need 
can be politically unpalatable. As controversial as property value assessments can be, the 
idea of measuring a tax base is relatively straightforward. Asserting that higher levels of 
per-capita expenditure in one area are ―necessary‖ or ―just,‖ while it advances equity in 
practice, may appear to violate the principle of equity.
10
 In addition, this policy approach, 
like others, creates winners and losers relative to the status quo. Any change is likely to 
be met with resistance from those who lose from the policy change, even if net social 
welfare is improved. 
Second, while the size of the tax base does not directly depend on preferences, the 
size and structure of public expenditures does, and so differentiating between 
idiosyncratic preferences for public goods and fiscal need must be done by assumption or 
                                                 
10
 For example, providing higher per-capita funds for schooling to a city with more children in poverty or 
higher teacher salaries may effectively provide the same level of service, but when making cross-
jurisdictional comparisons, funding levels are easier to compare than service levels, and the inequality of 
funding levels may appear to be inequitable. 
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by government definition. As is often the case, our estimates must be qualified by these 
assumptions, or by the adequacy of government guidelines.  
Finally, measurement of fiscal capacity runs into problems typical of 
measurement of stocks and flows of capital, while fiscal need measurement requires a 
more diverse set of variables: people and their possessions, the stock of existing public 
infrastructure, crime rates, public health measures—any major determinants of public 
expenditure. 
Despite these challenges, the literature has sought to develop some good measures 
of fiscal need. The primary approaches to measuring both fiscal capacity and fiscal need 
were developed by the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). 
Mushkin and Rivlin (1962) developed the Representative Tax System (RTS) to measure 
fiscal capacity, and Rafuse (1990) introduced the complementary Representative 
Expenditure System (RES) to measure fiscal need. In both cases, the approach uses mean 
values across SNGs as the benchmark to which all SNGs are compared, and produces 
absolute levels of capacity or need as well as an index for comparison across SNGs. 
The RTS approach has become well-established, but the RES approach has seen 
less use. Most noteworthy is the contribution of Robert Tannenwald, who produced a 
series of papers continuing and improving on Rafuse’s RES approach (Tannenwald 1999; 
Tannenwald and Cowan 1997; Tannenwald and Turner 2004; Yilmaz, Hoo, Nagowski, 
Rueben and Tannenwald 2006). The existing work using the RES method has relied on 
Rafuse’s original workload-based approach which, while informative and parsimonious 
with respect to data, relies heavily on assumptions in generating its estimates of fiscal 
need. Delaney (2007) looks at some of the difficulties faced when using workloads and 
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states as the unit of analysis and finds that the estimates are sensitive to variables selected 
for inclusion. Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) note that ―the technically most 
sophisticated techniques (notably local expenditure needs computed using a regression-
based [RES])…quite possibly provide the best possible measures.‖ (p. 329). If this is the 
best measure, why is it not more widely implemented? Bird and Vaillancourt (2007) 
provide some insight: 
Almost all who have studied the RTS-RES approach agree on two points: first, it 
is formally the most satisfactory way to meet the normative objectives of the 
theoretical equalization model, and, second, that it is difficult and costly to obtain 
the necessary data…, especially for expenditures. (284) 
This is certainly the case in many of the countries Bird and Vaillancourt consider. 
Data in the United States is readily accessible, however, and these data make it possible 
to explore the differences between workload- and regression-based approaches, as well as 
the practical data requirements for improving regression-based estimates. 
In addition, these representative approaches rely on the assumption that observed 
patterns of revenue and expenditure accurately capture decisions made by autonomous 
local governments in raising revenue and providing services to meet the needs of their 
constituents. To the extent that observed patterns instead represent structural 
inefficiencies from central control, discrimination across segments of society, or factor 
immobility, for example, both the RTS and RES would fail to correct for these historical 
problems. This is unlikely to be the case in the United States, but any implementation of 
an RTS-RES approach should consider these possible problems. 
This paper represents several contributions to the literature. First, we introduce a 
―hybrid-regression‖ method of determining fiscal need. Using this method, we make use 
of data from U.S. economic sub-national units, which we define as MSAs (or CMSAs, 
34 
 
where relevant) or the surrounding rural areas (hereafter referred to as a group as ―sub-
state areas‖). We produce per-capita need measures by sub-state area. Next we use this 
data to generate measures of fiscal need for SNGs, which include the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia. We thus contribute to the public finance and urban and regional 
economic literatures by producing the first MSA-level and sub-state-level measures of 
fiscal need for the United States as well as the first regression-based measures of fiscal 
need for states (including D.C.).
11
 Finally, we produce estimates using other regression-
based methods with different levels of data aggregation and different levels of data 
availability for comparison. 
We find that estimates of need depend on the approach used to estimate need 
levels. These estimates differ greatly from previous workload-based approaches, 
consistent with previous comparisons of regression- and workload-based estimates (Boex 
and Martinez-Vazquez 2007). The preferred estimates are relatively robust across 
regression-based approaches, maintain a U-shaped trend with respect to population 
density, and accord more closely with actual expenditure than previous estimates. 
Sub-state-level estimates also indicate that while the District of Columbia is an 
outlier among states, it is not unique among cities (Delaney 2007). Comparing measures 
developed with state- and sub-state-level data reveal high correlation. However, the use 
of state-level data significantly and systematically overestimates need in larger, less 
populated states, relative to the more disaggregated approach.  
                                                 
11
 Previous regression-based RES estimates exist for the provinces of Canada (Shah 1996) as well as the 
local governments within the state of Georgia, USA, in 1960 (Boex and Martinez-Vazquez 2007).  
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Cost and Comparability in States and Cities 
The RES method runs into several complications, which we refer to as 
comparability and cost. Figure 8 presents actual per-capita direct expenditures in the 
United States and illustrates the comparability issue: when developing relative measures 
and transforming them into absolutes, one must establish comparable jurisdictional units. 
The District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii provide obvious examples of idiosyncratic 
SNGs, although the same critique applies to many interstate comparisons. Looking at 
data from the 2002 Census of State and Local Government Finances, public expenditure 
varies across states, with direct per-capita expenditures in 2002 ranging from $4,746 in 
Arkansas to $10,802 in Alaska (Figure 8). In principle, actual expenditures should be 
positively correlated with expenditure need, but measuring disparity is difficult without 
accounting for heterogeneity. 
 
Figure 8. Per-capita state-and-local direct expenditure by state in 2002 ($1,000) 
States vary widely across a number of dimensions, including land area, 
population, urbanization, land rents, industrial characteristics, input costs, prices of final 
goods, and age distribution. To the extent that expenditure need might vary in ways 
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correlated with these characteristics, treating the state as the unit of observation may lead 
to problems in the measurement of fiscal need. 
The use of aggregated data reduces the cost of data acquisition but systematically 
changes inference. First, aggregation of data reduces information in an important way: if 
there are two areas, one with high wage or wealth inequality and the other with the same 
mean and median wage and wealth but a lower level of inequality, aggregation could 
make these two look similar and understate variation in fiscal need. In addition, to the 
extent that data availability exists at smaller units of observation, we can use more 
observations of disaggregated data to improve our estimation of fiscal need. 
Most importantly, however, there is a sound theoretical reason in this case, in 
particular, to prefer MSA-level data. Labor markets tend to be urban labor markets, and 
as Arnott and McMillan (2006) note: 
Although well-known studies of local labor markets have used US states as their 
unit of analysis, few believe that Los Angeles and San Francisco are in the same 
labor market, let alone the agricultural areas of the San Joaquin Valley. Indeed, 
the San Francisco labor market may be more similar and more closely tied to 
labor markets in Boston and Seattle than to rural areas in northern California. 
(386) 
To the extent that this is the case, the use of state wage levels may fail to account for 
input costs. 
The large literature on human capital externalities confirms a concern with 
explicitly accounting for labor costs. Recent results indicate that labor cost differences 
may, in fact, be driven by differences in productivity (Glaeser and Maré 2001), especially 
for white-collar workers (Gould 2007), for whom voluntary mobility may be highest. 
Comparing cities that are similar to one another (or part of the same national labor 
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market) rather than state-level wage data may better account for input costs in the 
provision of public goods. 
In addition, the determinants of need for public services may differ across 
heterogeneous areas, both in type and in quantity. Rural police expenditures, for example, 
might depend more on land area that police forces must cover than on the incidence of 
crime, while in urban areas, population density and poverty might be primary 
determinants of police expenditures. Similarly, transportation costs in education and 
hospital provision would likely be much greater in rural areas than in towns or cities. We 
can use data to try to account for this. Using the sub-state-level as the unit of analysis and 
allowing the effect of a given determinant on expenditure need to vary across ―types‖ of 
places provides comparability of input costs and of the basket of public goods required in 
an area. 
As is visible in Figure 9, actual public expenditures have a pronounced U-shape 
with respect to population density (here and elsewhere, the traditional RES results are 
taken from Yilmaz et al. 2006 ). This relationship is robust to the exclusion of outliers 
and to the scale under consideration—it holds for both states and sub-state areas. The 
optimal jurisdiction size literature provides some insight as to why this might be the case. 
Because of this robust and pronounced relationship, we categorize types of places 
(―clusters‖) by using an index of urbanization in our preferred approach. This allows for 
flexibility in the determinants of need across clusters. While this has intuitive and 
theoretical appeal, the soundness of this approach is ultimately an empirical question. If 
there is no systematic effect, a Chow test will prevent rejection of the null of equality of 
coefficients across clusters. In addition, we present results in which this flexibility is 
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removed in case favoring density over other factors in this way negatively affects our 
results. 
 
Figure 9. Measures of state expenditure need by state population density 
 Traditional RES data taken from Yilmaz et al. 2006. 
A recurring critique of regression-based estimates of net fiscal benefit is that they 
suffer relative to other approaches because they are less transparent (McLarty 1997). It is 
not entirely clear that this is a disadvantage. In any case, as Shah (1997) notes, the 
potential for abuse is no greater than that of a RTS-based equalization program, in which 
assessment of tax bases and selection of tax rates are both explicitly determined by SNGs 
in many cases. 
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Several Methods 
We look at seven different approaches; 4 at the state level and 3 at the sub-state 
level. This paper advocates for a ―hybrid-regression‖ method, a method that shares 
features with two other sub-state-level-based regression approaches, the MSA-regression 
and the cluster-regression, both of which we will detail further below. The hybrid-
regression method provides flexibility in both baskets of public services and input costs 
and makes it possible to correct for systematic revenue constraints in some areas. This 
preference over a pooled approach is supported by the data—using a Chow test, we can 
reject the null that public expenditure determination is homogenous across clusters at the 
p < 0.001 level—and the estimates are systematically different from those using state-
level data. 
Before looking at the relationship between estimates generated by the different 
methods, their theoretical differences warrant a brief discussion. In all regression-based 
approaches, we use data to separate expenditures into those parts determined by revenue-
raising capacity, by idiosyncratic preference (by constituents or their government), and 
by fiscal need. We can then hold revenue and preference constant across economic units 
to come up with a measure of fiscal need by isolating expenditure related to need 
determinants. 
Previous literature has used different approaches to account for heterogeneity. 
Shah (1996) fixes revenue measures at the national average (across Canadian provinces) 
and fixes coefficients across all provinces. Our state-based regression method essentially 
replicates this approach for the United States, using states and the District as units of 
analysis. Using states as the unit of analysis produces regression-based measures of 
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expenditure need directly comparable to workload-based measures outlined in Rafuse 
(1990) and succeeding papers, including a previous analysis of 2002 expenditure data 
(Yilmaz et al. 2006). The MSA-regression method uses sub-state areas as units of 
analysis, but replicates Shah’s approach as well, with revenue measures and need 
coefficients fixed across provinces. 
The cluster-regression and hybrid-regression methods rely on an index of 
urbanization to sort sub-state areas into clusters, but treat these clusters differently. The 
cluster-regression method treats each cluster as a separate population of data, allowing 
coefficients to vary across clusters and setting the average level of revenue at the within-
cluster mean. The hybrid-regression method allows coefficients to vary across clusters, 
providing flexibility in the baskets of services and input costs across sub-state areas, but 
sets the average level of revenue at the national mean revenue. 
These methods vary by the unit of analysis, by the constraints placed upon the 
basket of services and the scope of potential implied redistribution. The state-regression 
method relies on political place definitions, while the MSA-, cluster-, and hybrid-
regression methods all use sub-state areas, which are perhaps more defensible economic 
units of analysis. The state- and MSA-regression methods hold the basket of services and 
input costs fixed across all sub-state areas, while the cluster- and hybrid-regression 
methods allow places that are substantially different in urbanization to have substantially 
different determinants of need. Finally, all methods use some average level of revenue as 
a baseline, and so the measures involve some implicit ―redistribution.‖ Total expenditure 
is the same, but the RES approach redistributes expenditure based on need. The cluster-
based approach constrains redistribution to happen within clusters, while the state-, 
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MSA-, and hybrid-regression methods all allow redistribution to happen across the entire 
population, which would be preferable if cities or rural areas are needier than average in 
systematic ways, but are constrained in their ability to raise revenue. Table 4 illustrates 
the relevant differences across all the different approaches. 
 
Table 4. Seven approaches to estimating fiscal need in the United States 
Approach 
Workload-
based 
Regression-based 
Traditional State MSA Cluster Hybrid Single Barebones 
Regressor selection 
process 
Structural 
State-
level 
Sub-state-level 
State-
level 
Population 
and land 
area only 
Capacity/preference 
indicator means 
national 
mean state 
value 
national 
mean 
state 
value 
national 
mean 
sub-state 
value 
Within-
cluster 
mean 
sub-state 
value 
national 
mean 
sub-state 
value 
national 
mean 
state 
value 
national 
mean state 
value 
Regression 
coefficients 
restricted to 
equality 
N/A 
Across 
all states 
Across 
all 
sub-
states 
Within 
cluster 
Within 
cluster 
Across all 
states 
Across all 
states 
Expenditure broken 
down by category? 
Y Y Y Y Y N N 
Total units of 
observation 
51 51 323 323 323 51 51 
Total number of 
regressions 
0 7 7 63 63 1 1 
 
Two other regression-based methods are presented. Throughout the RES 
literature, expenditure is broken down by major category before it is analyzed. In 
practice, this means that a system of at least seven equations (seven by nine clusters for 
sixty-three, sometimes) is estimated for the regression-based methods. The single-
regression method replicates the state-regression method, but instead of using spending 
by category, it relies on a single regression of expenditure on capacity and determinants 
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of need to produce its results.
12
 The barebones-regression method replicates the single-
regression method, but uses only population and land area as determinants of need, to 
provide a true minimum performance improvement from a regression-based approach. 
In addition to these four regression-based methods, we compare regression-based 
results to those generated by the traditional workload-based approach, in which 
determinants of need are selected beforehand and the index is constructed ex ante (here 
and elsewhere, traditional results are taken from Yilmaz et al. 2006). Some other data 
about the ―correct‖ percentage of expenditure on elementary and secondary education, for 
example, is used, and a structural formula is determined with pre-assigned weights. This 
is a much less data-intensive but much more constrained approach and is sensitive to 
incorrect specification. In practice, this may be particularly useful for establishing a 
prescriptive expenditure norm, and its relationship with the regression-based approach 
may indicate the distance between the standards of service that are currently observed 
and those embodied in the structural formula. 
In all cases, expenditure and capacity data is taken from the 2002 Census of State 
and Local Government Finances. Determinants of expenditure need and political 
preference are taken from the 2000 Census, from the 2000 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 
and from the 1997 Economic Census. 
While the approaches differ somewhat, the process itself is straightforward. We 
use a modified version of that laid out in Shah (1996) for the regression-based methods:  
Step 1. Disaggregate expenditures into major functional categories. 
                                                 
12
 This may introduce aggregation problems, but represents the simplest case in terms of expenditure data 
collection, and illustrates the scope of such aggregation problems. 
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Step 2. For each expenditure category, select determinants of expenditure from 
several categories: those that determine fiscal capacity, those that exhibit 
an idiosyncratic preference for public services, and those that indicate a 
need for public services. 
Step 3. Estimate influence on spending levels of both capacity/preference and 
need/cost indicators through regression analysis. 
Step 4. Holding capacity/preference indicators constant at the mean, evaluate 
regression results for individual need/cost levels to construct per-capita 
expenditure need.  
For the cluster-based approaches (cluster- and hybrid-regression methods), we modify the 
procedure as follows: 
Step 2a′. Using an index of urbanization, sort sub-state areas into subgroups, or 
―clusters.‖ 
Step 3′. For each cluster, estimate influence on spending levels of both 
capacity/preference and need/cost indicators through regression analysis. 
Step 4′. Holding capacity/preference indicators constant at an average level 
(cluster-level mean for cluster-regression, national sub-state-area mean for 
hybrid-regression), evaluate regression results for individual need/cost 
levels to construct per-capita expenditure need. 
Step 5. Disaggregate expenditure need down to the county level, and aggregate 
back up to the state level. 
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What Determines Public Expenditures? 
Following Rafuse (1990), total direct expenditure is broken down into seven 
categories: 
• Elementary & Secondary Education (29.8% of total direct expenditure) 
• Public Welfare (16.9% of total direct expenditure) 
• Higher Education (10.1% of total direct expenditure) 
• Health & Hospitals (8.9% of total direct expenditure) 
• Highways (7.5% of total direct expenditure) 
• Police (3.2% of total direct expenditure) 
• and All Other Expenditures (29.7% of total direct expenditure)  
For each expenditure category, determinants of need and of capacity are selected. 
We will report those selected for the cluster, MSA, and hybrid estimates; the set 
considered is large and available upon request. For the state regression-based estimates, 
the same procedure was used to select variables, as if more disaggregated data were 
unavailable and information on the relevance of a particular variable could only be 
inferred from state-level data. All variables are in per-capita terms (or percentages of the 
population) unless otherwise specified. In addition, all capacity measures are combined 
state and local unless otherwise specified. For sub-state areas, state and local measures 
are combined on a per-capita basis. 
When constructing these indices, endogeneity bears particular consideration. The 
most important form of endogeneity derives from the fact that a number of the regressors 
might be justly considered either determinants of need or measures of idiosyncratic 
45 
 
preference.
13
 While this may be a concern, we can examine the potential effect of the 
difficulty. Using the subset of disputable variables, we can consider them as purely 
determinants of need or purely elements of political preference. While these variables 
describe some of the variance, they do not seem to be driving the main results: the 
correlation between the sub-state-level regression-based expenditure need with and 
without the assumption that these variables represent preferences is .9838. 
In light of the small magnitude of the likely effect, except for the case of the 
political party affiliation of the state Governor, all variables considered in these models 
are treated as determinants of either capacity or need.
14
 In practice, it would fall to 
policymakers to decide on a case-by-case basis which variables are indicators of need and 
which indicate preference before doing any such analysis with the end goal of 
implementing a regression-based equalization scheme. 
In addition to the problem of discriminating between need and preference 
variables, public expenditures and tax revenue are highly endogenous—most SNGs are 
required by law to maintain balanced budgets, and the data support revenues as the 
primary determinant of expenditures. Fortunately, for our purposes, the RES method for 
measuring fiscal need has the advantage of relying little on specific variable-by-variable 
causal arguments for its results. This reduced-form approach means that causal inference 
relying on the coefficients is inadvisable, but that the indices constructed will satisfy the 
                                                 
13
 For example, migrants from the Midwest may place a demand on highway expenditures because they are 
acclimated to an area with readily accessible highways, bring cars when they move, and thus demand 
highway expenditures in order to enjoy the use of their cars. Alternatively, they may be more likely than 
most to move to areas where manufacturing is an important sector of the economy. Manufacturing 
generally occurs in relatively diffuse places, and so the distribution of housing relative to the workplace 
may require longer commutes. Whether this is a ―desire‖ for longer commutes or a ―need‖ for longer 
commutes can be debated. 
14
 The set of variables considered does not include many that clearly reflect idiosyncratic preferences. The 
inclusion of more elaborate measures of voter preference, including, for example, religious affiliation or 
outcomes of referenda, would be a useful avenue for future research on public expenditure determination. 
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goals of the method: providing a measure of the amount of public funds required to 
provide an average level of services within an area that is characterized by a particular set 
of observable variables. 
For elementary and secondary education, the determinants of capacity are general 
own-source revenue, property taxes, individual income taxes, and state debt at the end of 
the year.
15
 Determinants of need include the population between 5 and 17 years of age, 
the population attending private high school, the population with at least a bachelor’s 
degree, and the number of households receiving some form of public assistance. 
For public welfare expenditures, determinants of capacity include general own-
source revenue, long-term debt outstanding, and federal intergovernmental revenue for 
public welfare. The determinants of need are the number of households receiving some 
form of public assistance, the native population born in the state of current residence, the 
population living with total income below the poverty line, the percentage of married 
families, and the population under 18 years of age. 
For higher education, the capacity variables include charges for higher education, 
federal intergovernmental revenue for education, and total cash securities. The political 
party of the governor is included as a measure of preference for education expenditure. 
The determinants of need are the population with no schooling and the population that 
commutes to work via carpool. 
Health and hospital capacity is determined by federal intergovernmental revenue 
for health and hospitals and total hospital charges. Need determinants include the log of 
the median rent in a given area and full-time government employment in 1997. 
                                                 
15
 Here and elsewhere, it is possible that ―double-counting‖ might occur. The method attempts to use these 
variables as proxies for overall capacity, so if including both own-source revenue and individual income 
taxes improves explanatory power without introducing multicollinearity problems, we include both. 
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The capacity variables for highway expenditure are federal intergovernmental 
revenue for highways, and interest earnings on investments. The determinants of need 
include land area and population density (defined as log (population/land area)), as well 
as the following per-capita measures: high school graduates, rural population living on 
farmland, and the population that migrated from the Midwest. 
The sole capacity variable for expenditure on police and protection is general 
own-source revenue. The determinants of need include population, population density, 
and land area, as well as the percentage of families that are married, the percentage of 
households with less than $15,000/year in income, and a standardized index of crime 
calculated using the number of reported assaults, armed robberies, auto thefts, burglaries, 
larcenies, murders, rapes, and robberies in the year 2000. Per-capita need determinants 
for police expenditure include the native population born in state of current residence, the 
over-65 population in poverty, the population commuting to work via bicycle, and the 
urban population.  
―Other Expenditures‖ have four measures of capacity: general own-source 
revenue, federal intergovernmental revenue for other expenditures, tobacco tax revenue 
and general debt interest. Determinants of expenditure include land area, per-capita 
income, the population commuting to work by bike or on foot, the number of households 
in urban areas and the number of households receiving public assistance. 
Given the potential effects of unobservable characteristics within each area, these 
regressions are run as a system of equations using a seemingly-unrelated regression 
(SUR) framework. Table 5 shows regression equations for the pooled MSA-level model. 
The regression equations have quite a good fit, with a system adjusted R
2
 of .83. While 
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not our preferred model, this regression equation is reported to provide a sense of the 
magnitude and direction of the effects of the determinants of need and measures of fiscal 
capacity. 
Because of its flexibility with respect to entrenched revenue constraints and 
baskets of services across clusters, the preferred model is the hybrid-regression model. 
Using a Chow test, we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across 
clusters at the p < 0.000 level, which is to say that our intuition that public expenditures 
are indeed determined differently across areas with different levels of ―urbanization‖ 
turns out to be well-founded, and thus that a cluster-based regression approach is 
preferable to the pooled approach. Regression equations for all regression-based 
approaches are available on request. 
Comparing Apples to Apples to Oranges 
As previously discussed, we consider a number of approaches to measuring fiscal 
need. Table 6 presents the top five, median, and bottom five states and sub-state areas by 
estimate of fiscal need. As our primary focus is on the relative performance of different 
approaches to estimating expenditure need, we relegate the full reporting of point 
estimates of expenditure need to Appendices C (by state) and D (by sub-state area). In 
this section, we will discuss the ways in which estimates differ across states, and how 
these results vary by approach. 
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Table 5. Regression results from pooled MSA-level SUR 
System’s adjusted R2 = 0.8318. p-values <0.001 unless listed in parentheses below coefficient 
 
PUBWELF = CONST + HHPA + LT18 + MARRIED + NATIVE + POOR + OSREV + LTD + FIPW 
      
R2 = 0.76 
 
0.688 
 
7.567 
 
-1.823 
 
0.688 
 
0.183 
 
-1.506 
 
0.028 
 
0.019 
 
0.844 
      
              
(0.008) 
          
                         
POLICE = CONST + AREA + BIKE + CRIME + MARRIED + NATIVE + POORHH + POOR>65 + POP + POPDEN + URBAN + OSREV 
R2 = 0.68   2.841   0   3.918   0.013   -0.227   -0.057   -0.367   2.841   0.005   -0.011   0.108   0.029 
        (0.035)           (0.002)                             
                                                  
HIGHWAY = CONST + AREA + FARM + HS + MIGMW + FIHW + INTREV + POPDEN 
        
R2 = 0.67 
 
0.091 
 
-0.001 
 
1.041 
 
0.547 
 
0.321 
 
0.645 
 
0.438 
 
-0.033 
        
    
(0.001) 
 
(0.005) 
                  
                         
HIEDUC = CONST + RGOV + CARPOOL + NOSCHOOL + CASHSEC + FIHE + HIEDCHG                     
R2 = 0.71   0.12   -0.018   2.159   1.319   0.004   0.547   1.327                     
        (0.019)       (0.040)                                 
                                                  
HEALTH = CONST + GOVEMP + RENT + FIHH + HHCHG 
              
R2 = 0.94 
 
-2.485 
 
3.97 
 
0.303 
 
0.445 
 
0.975 
              
        
(0.041) 
                
                         
ESEDUC = CONST + COLLEGE + HHPA + POP517 + PRIV + OSREV + PROPTAX + STDEBT + YTAX             
R2 = 0.74   -0.567   -0.567   3.834   6.2   -21.872   0.102   0.226   0.715   0.119             
        (0.028)                                         
                                                  
OTHER = CONST + AREA + BIKEWALK + HHPA + HURBAN + INCOME + DEBTINT + FIOTHER + OSREV + TOBACCO 
    
R2 = 0.85 
 
-1.382 
 
0.003 
 
7.552 
 
9.787 
 
1.076 
 
0 
 
1.461 
 
1.425 
 
0.299 
 
17.345 
    
                    
(0.008) 
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Table 5 continued. Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Description 
AREA Land Area (1,000 sq miles) 
BIKE Population that bikes to work (%) 
BIKEWALK Population commuting to work via bike or on foot (%) 
CARPOOL Population commuting to work via carpool (%) 
CASHSEC Total cash securities held ($ per capita) 
COLLEGE Population with college degree or higher (%) 
CRIME Crime index 
DEBTINT General debt interest ($ per capita) 
FARM Population living on a farm (%) 
FIHE Federal Intergovernmental Transfers for higher education ($ per capita) 
FIHH Federal Intergovernmental Transfers for health and hospitals ($ per capita) 
FIHW Federal Intergovernmental Transfers for highways ($ per capita) 
FIOTHER Federal Intergovernmental Transfers for other categories ($ per capita) 
FIPW Federal intergovernmental transfers for public welfare ($ per-capita) 
GOVEMP Population employed full-time by the government in 1997 (%) 
HHCHG Total charges received for hospitals ($ per capita) 
HHPA Households receiving public assistance (per-capita) 
HIEDCHG Total charges received for Higher Education ($ per capita) 
HS Population with a high-school diploma (%) 
HURBAN Housing stock in urban areas (per-capita) 
INCOME Per-capita income 
INTREV Total State & Local Interest Revenue ($ per capita) 
LT18 Population below age 18 (%) 
LTD Long term debt outstanding ($ per capita) 
MARRIED Families that are married (%) 
MIGMW Population that migrated from the Midwest (%) 
NATIVE Population that is native-born living in state of birth (%) 
NOSCHOOL Population with no schooling (%) 
OSREV General own-source revenue ($ per capita) 
POOR Population living below poverty line (%) 
POOR>65 Population below poverty line over age 65 (% of total population) 
POORHH Households with income less than $15,000 (%) 
POP Population (millions) 
POP517 Population between 5 and 17 years of age (%) 
POPDEN Population density (log(Population/Land Area)) 
PRIV Population attending private high school (%) 
PROPTAX Revenue from property taxes ($ per capita) 
RENT Log Rent (=log(median earnings * median rent as % of income)) 
RGOV 1 if State Governor is Republican 
STDEBT State Debt outstanding at end of year ($ per capita) 
TOBACCO Revenue from tobacco taxes ($ per capita) 
URBAN Population living in Urbanized Areas or Urban Clusters (%) 
YTAX Revenue from State & Local Income Tax ($ per capita) 
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Table 6. Top 5, Median, and Bottom 5 States and sub-state areas by fiscal need 
State 
Hybrid State Traditional Actual Difference 
Need Rank Need Rank Need Rank Need Rank Need Rank 
Alaska $8,177 1 $9,226 1 $5,995 21 $13,418 1 $5,241 1 
Hawaii $6,767 2 $6,938 3 $5,216 50 $6,828 7 $61 15 
Wyoming $6,564 3 $6,534 4 $5,894 23 $7,677 4 $1,113 4 
Minnesota $6,560 4 $6,274 11 $5,553 45 $7,052 5 $492 8 
Connecticut $6,448 5 $6,199 15 $5,772 31 $6,789 9 $341 10 
   
 
  
      
  
Oklahoma $6,012 26 $6,163 17 $6,059 19 $5,109 45 -$903 47 
   
 
  
      
  
South Carolina $5,682 47 $5,747 48 $5,745 33 $5,903 21 $221 13 
Arkansas $5,631 48 $5,689 49 $6,539 3 $4,746 51 -$885 46 
Louisiana $5,548 49 $5,781 45 $6,631 2 $5,287 40 -$261 28 
Alabama $5,448 50 $5,558 51 $6,492 4 $5,308 38 -$140 21 
Mississippi $5,442 51 $5,672 50 $6,800 1 $5,296 39 -$146 22 
 
Sub-State Area 
Hybrid Actual Difference 
Need Rank Need Rank Amount Rank 
Alaska - Rural $7,857 1 $13,694 1 $5,837 1 
Anchorage, AK MSA $7,768 2 $13,029 2 $5,261 2 
Massachusetts - Rural $7,096 3 $10,010 3 $2,914 3 
Fresno, CA MSA $6,983 4 $6,821 37 -$162 170 
Visalia--Tulare--Porterville, CA MSA $6,925 5 $7,850 7 $925 36 
   
 
  
    
Wilmington, NC MSA $5,692 162 $7,795 8 $2,103 5 
   
 
  
    
Mississippi - Rural $5,042 319 $5,104 238 $62 131 
Houma, LA MSA $5,024 320 $6,132 91 $1,108 26 
Lafayette, LA MSA $4,991 321 $4,693 283 -$298 201 
Bryan--College Station, TX MSA $4,963 322 $4,388 313 -$575 250 
Auburn--Opelika, AL MSA $4,682 323 $4,686 285 $4 137 
 
Following Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007), we present correlation 
coefficients across measures of need in Table 7. Our results are similar to those of Boex 
and Martinez-Vazquez, who also find a correlation of -0.11 between actual expenditure 
and the traditional RES approach, and positive correlations between actual expenditure 
and their regression RES results. In addition, the estimates generated by our preferred 
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approach, the hybrid-regression method, are highly correlated with the other regression-
based approaches, implying that these results are relatively robust to different 
specifications. We also find a high correlation between the hybrid- and state-regression 
estimates, despite the loss of information from aggregation and the use of a different set 
of regressors. 
 
Table 7. Correlation coefficients for different measures of expenditure need 
 
Actual 
Expenditure 
Hybrid MSA Cluster State Single Trad. Adj. R
2
 
Hybrid 0.7860 
    
 
 
.8600 
MSA 0.7892 0.9667 
   
 
 
.8318 
Cluster 0.7529 0.9059 0.9406 
  
 
 
.8600 
State 0.9088 0.8811 0.9128 0.8222 
 
 
 
.9356 
Single 0.4586 0.6995 0.7556 0.7149 0.7021  
 
.9740 
Traditional -0.1192 -0.2845 -0.2583 -0.2067 -0.1975 0.0864 
 
--- 
Barebones 0.5036 0.6394 0.6594 0.5529 0.6819 0.6672 0.0196 .7329 
 
The traditional RES approach is negatively correlated or uncorrelated with all the 
regression-based approaches. The barebones approach (which uses only area and 
population) displays a surprisingly high correlation with our preferred approach, the 
hybrid-regression method—which bodes well for our ability to account for expenditure 
need with poor data: at least in the United States, population and area are important 
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determinants of public expenditure. Using units of observation less varied in size and 
population may change these results, although the similarity between state-based and sub-
state estimates indicates that the results are robust to scale.  
Figure 10 presents kernel density estimates of the distributions of the most 
important measures of expenditure need: the hybrid results, the state-based results, and 
the traditional RES method. All three approaches reduce the variance of the expenditure 
estimates, which both accords well with theory and should occur of necessity; recall not 
only that the goal is to isolate the difference in expenditure that derives from differences 
in need across areas, but also that much of this effect is attained by holding capacity 
measures constant at the national or cluster-based average level. In addition, the variance 
in estimates among the hybrid approach is lower than that of the state-based approach 
(p<0.02 using an F-test). The finer data resolution available without aggregation allows 
us to account for more expenditure heterogeneity across states, and more finely isolate 
that portion of expenditure which is related to need. 
Figure 9 (page 38) plots the same measures of expenditure need against state 
population density. The marked U-shape of actual expenditures with respect to 
population density is greatly muted in the regression-based approaches, but is still 
present. While Alaska and the District of Columbia appear to be outliers, the underlying 
U-shape is robust to their exclusion. The traditional RES approach, however, appears to 
show no meaningful relationship between expenditure need and population density. 
Figure 11 presents hybrid regression and MSA regression estimates of 
expenditure need, along with actual expenditure, against sub-state area population 
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Figure 10. Kernel density estimates of hybrid, state-based, and traditional RES estimates 
against actual expenditures 
 
density. The U-shape of actual expenditure and expenditure need with respect to 
population density is again robust to the exclusion of outliers. One point of note is that 
while the District of Columbia is an outlier when compared to states across a number of 
dimensions, it is no longer an outlier when considering sub-state-level data, either in 
terms of actual expenditure or expenditure need. The outliers in the sub-state-level 
analysis are rural Alaska, the Anchorage MSA, and rural Massachusetts, all of which 
spend more than $10,000 per capita.
16
 
                                                 
16
 This is likely due to Alaska’s oil-revenue redistribution policies and rural Massachusetts’ citizens’ high 
income, which may increase both the demand for and the cost of public services.  
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Figure 11. Measures of sub-state-level expenditure need by sub-state population density 
Figure 12 presents the geographical distribution of expenditure need under the 
hybrid approach. Figure 13 illustrates the comparative results of the state-based approach 
and the hybrid approach. Due to an aggregation effect, we hypothesize that the state-
based approach would be expected to overestimate expenditure need for areas that are 
relatively large and less populous. Table 8 presents a simple OLS regression of the 
difference between the state and hybrid results on land area and population density and 
confirms that there is a systematic difference in the estimates generated by these two 
regression-based methods. This difference is economically significant: our results imply 
that aggregation at the state level represents a 15% overestimate of expenditure need for 
the District of Columbia and a 4% underestimate of need for Minnesota, with the rest of 
the states arrayed in between. 
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Figure 12. Hybrid-regression RES results across States 
(darker implies greater expenditure need) 
 
Figure 13. State-based regression vs. Hybrid-regression 
(Dark implies State-based expenditure need estimate is higher than Hybrid) 
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Table 8. The difference in regression-based expenditure need estimates dependent on 
land area and population density 
Difference between State & Hybrid 
regression RES estimates (State – Hybrid) 
land area 9.52e-07 
 
(0.033) 
log(population) -0.109 
 
(0.004) 
Constant 1.645 
 
(0.004) 
Observations 51 
R
2 
0.24 
p-values in parentheses 
 
Figure 14 shows the difference between the traditional RES results and the hybrid 
regression estimates, and the traditional RES results clearly overestimate expenditure 
need for the South. There are a number of possible reasons for this, but the most likely 
seems to be the approach to adjusting for input costs. With no input cost adjustment, for 
example, estimates would tend to be much higher wherever wages were lower, because  
the poverty rate would tend to be higher in those areas—expenditure need and input costs 
are both correlated with the prevailing wage. 
Accounting for input costs should mitigate that effect to some extent, but if we 
consider two areas with similar median wages, one of which has high wage inequality, 
and one of which has low wage inequality, then accounting for median wages will not 
account for the higher cost of providing public services (from the relatively higher wage 
half of the population) and the higher need for public services (for the lower wage half) in 
the area with greater wage inequality. Comparing expenditures using a regression-based 
approach—particularly one that attempts to compare areas with similar labor markets to 
one another—should account for not only a median-wage effect, but to some extent for a 
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Figure 14. Traditional estimates of fiscal need vs. Hybrid estimates 
(Dark implies Traditional projects higher required per-capita expenditure) 
full distributional wage effect. We hypothesize that the difference between the traditional 
approach and our regression-based results is linked to wage-inequality across states. 
Another possible source of the difference between the sub-state approaches and 
any state-based approach could arise from within-state heterogeneity. Heterogeneity 
should increase the effect of aggregation on a state’s expenditure need estimates. Because 
size may be a proxy for heterogeneity, an alternative hypothesis to account for the 
disparity between our results and previous results might be an aggregation effect, 
although the similarity between regression results across different scales indicates that 
this does not fully explain the disparity. 
Figure 15 presents the difference between the hybrid regression estimates and 
actual expenditure. When compared to overall hybrid estimates (see the final column in 
Table 6), it becomes clear that states with actual expenditures higher than estimated 
expenditure need are states with high estimates of expenditure need to begin with, in 
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general. In other words, states with high levels of need overspend, and states with low 
levels of need do not spend enough. 
 
 
Figure 15. Hybrid estimate of fiscal need vs. Actual per-capita expenditure 
(Dark implies over-expenditure, Light implies under-expenditure) 
In general we should expect places that spend more to have a higher level of 
expenditure need, both based on the principle that policymakers are doing their jobs and 
on some insight from basic political economy. The fact that actual expenditure might not 
only be correlated with our estimates of need, but that policymakers might overshoot in 
both directions makes sense as well. States with the highest levels of expenditure need 
might have the largest percentage of constituents who might directly benefit from greater 
public expenditure, while those with the lowest levels of expenditure need are more likely 
to have net contributors to the public good outnumbering net beneficiaries. We 
hypothesize then that the population receiving a NFB greater than 0 is larger in those 
states with higher levels of public spending. 
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Conclusion 
We have presented a data-intensive approach to estimating expenditure need in 
the United States in the hope of producing a benchmark to which other approaches might 
be compared. Our findings echo those of Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2002) in that the 
regression-based approaches appear to be (very slightly) negatively correlated with those 
achieved by traditional representative expenditure approaches. 
The evidence appears to suggest that these regression-based approaches are 
preferable in a few different dimensions. First, these estimates are less sensitive to 
specification in both unit of analysis and selection of regressors than are more traditional 
methods that rely on structural assumptions. Second, regression-based estimates accord 
more closely with actual expenditure, both in relation to population density and to 
geographical distribution. As previously discussed, this represents an advantage for 
regression-based approaches, as both the RTS and RES approaches rely on the 
assumption that, on average, sub-national government tax and expenditure packages do 
not raise problems in and of themselves. Finally, the use of data to decide upon the 
determinants of need seems consistent with this assumption as well, as regression-based 
approaches use underlying relationships within actual expenditure, demographic, and 
characteristic data to apportion expenditure need.  
In addition to presenting a comparison of traditional and regression-based 
approaches to estimating expenditure need, we have presented a comparison of the 
effects of using state-level data relative to sub-state-level data. Sub-state-level data 
provide the advantage of allowing determinants of need to differ across clusters of places, 
which allows for better estimation of expenditure need. In addition, it allows for better 
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comparison across similar labor markets, so that the need to explicitly account for input 
costs is mitigated or eliminated. While the estimates are relatively robust to the choice 
between state-based and sub-state-level approaches, the state-based approaches provide 
less variance in estimates, and thus capture less of the expenditure need variation across 
places, and systematically overestimate need in larger, less densely populated places. 
This last insight confirms the intuition that more heavily urbanized areas, with greater 
wage and wealth inequality, are likely to have systematic underestimation of expenditure 
need under a state-based approach. 
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Chapter III: Evading Nash Traps in Two-Player Simultaneous Games: 
Two New Concepts 
Introduction 
When people play strategic games with strangers, the problem they face is not a 
simple one—this is fundamentally different from mere constrained optimization.  As von 
Neumann and Morgenstern argue: 
This is certainly no maximum problem, but a peculiar and disconcerting mix of 
several conflicting maximum problems…. [Other players’ actions] cannot, from 
[the player’s] point of view be described by statistical assumptions. This is 
because the others are guided, just as he himself, by rational principles—whatever 
that may mean—and no modus procedendi can be correct which does not attempt 
to understand those principles and the interactions of the conflicting interests of 
all participants. (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) 
Under such conditions, how can we expect people to behave? Nash equilibrium is 
perhaps the most widely applied tool of analysis in attempting to understand and address 
this question. In many cases, it performs quite well; the existence results presented in 
Nash’s original paper recommend it highly, and its refinements make up the foundation 
for study in both strategic- and extensive-form games (1951). Sometimes, however, the 
Nash prediction is Pareto-inferior to another strategy profile—perhaps the clearest case of 
this is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. If mutually preferable profiles can be supported, all 
players will be made better off. Previous literature has relied on external coordinating 
devices or repetition to achieve efficiency (Aumann 1974, Friedman 1971). This paper 
introduces strategic concepts that are at least as efficient as Nash predictions. 
Under certain institutions, Nash equilibrium performs well in predicting behavior. 
This is an important result: if Nash equilibrium predicts behavior, then we may be able to 
design an institution to achieve a particular outcome that has desirable properties. In one-
63 
 
shot simultaneous games, however, the experimental evidence on the predictive power of 
the Nash concept has been mixed. Frank et al. (1993) find that participants in a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game with nonbinding communication chose dominated strategies between 
39% (economics undergraduates) and 60% (other majors) of the time. Stahl and Wilson 
(1995) find that 42.8% of responses in one-shot 3x3 games with pure-strategy NE are 
non-NE. Cooper et al. (1996) find that 22% of subjects’ responses are dominated in one-
shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games. 
In some games—particularly those in which strategic interactions can lead to 
Pareto improvements—subjects systematically deviate from game-theoretic predictions, 
with a non-trivial proportion playing dominated strategies. The centipede game (Figure 
16) is perhaps the most oft-cited extensive-form game of this kind—McKelvey and 
Palfrey (1992) find that 85-99% of first movers in their centipede games choose the non-
Nash strategy and 15-31% of last movers play the dominated strategy. The Traveler’s 
Dilemma (Figure 17) is an important illustrative example among the class of 
simultaneous games (Basu 1994). Capra et al. (1999) report on a set of repeated 
Traveler’s Dilemma games and find that only under extreme conditions do decisions 
approach the Nash prediction. Becker et al. (2005) report that 20% of their respondents 
choose the dominated strategy in a one-shot Traveler’s Dilemma. 
While Nash equilibrium may not always predict behavior well, the desirability, 
simplicity, and plausibility of axiomatic representations of Nash equilibrium attest to its 
normative power. In equilibrium, by definition, one’s decisions are robust to a unilateral 
deviation: the strategy played is the strategy one ought to play, given others’ strategies. 
The Nash prediction is also the strategy one ought to play to maintain consistency with  
64 
 
 
Figure 16. Four-stage centipede game 
 2 3 4 5   97 98 99 100 
2 2, 2 4, 0 4, 0 4, 0 
  
4, 0 4, 0 4, 0 4, 0 
3 0, 4 3, 3 5, 1 5, 1 5, 1 5, 1 5, 1 5, 1 
4 0, 4 1, 5 4, 4 6, 2 6, 2 6, 2 6, 2 6, 2 
5 0, 4 1, 5 2, 6 5, 5 7, 3 7, 3 7, 3 7, 3 
       
97 0, 4 1, 5 2, 6 3, 7 
  
97, 97 99, 95 99, 95 99, 95 
98 0, 4 1, 5 2, 6 3, 7 95, 99 98, 98 100, 96 100, 96 
99 0, 4 1, 5 2, 6 3, 7 95, 99 96, 100 99, 99 101,97 
100 0, 4 1, 5 2, 6 3, 7 95, 99 96, 100 97, 101 100, 100 
Figure 17. Traveler’s Dilemma 
 
apparently plausible axioms of rationality: a long line of research has sought an internally 
consistent generalized set of predictions by transforming the problem into a Bayesian 
decision problem. This approach has yielded advances in our understanding of, among 
other things, the relationship between belief and equilibrium, the epistemic conditions for 
Nash equilibrium, and rationalizability and admissibility (Harsanyi 1976, Aumann and 
1 1 2 2 R R r r 
D D d d 
1, 0 3, 1 0, 2 2, 4 
3, 3 
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Brandenburger 1995, Tan and Werlang 1988, Asheim and Dufwenberg 2003, Pearce 
1984, Bernheim 1984). 
In practice, however, it is unclear that Nash predictions recommend those 
strategies one ought to play, except in two cases: in the first, other agents’ actions are 
given, in which case the problem becomes one of constrained optimization, begging the 
question posed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. In the second, one highly values 
consistency with the set of axioms of rationality upon which the equilibrium hinges. In 
these games, however, consistency with a particular set of axioms provides no utility. 
Following Vernon Smith’s taxonomy of a microeconomic system (1982), Nash 
predictions and agents’ choices might differ because of a divergence in the workings of 
the environment, the institution, or of subject behavior. In light of the simplicity of the 
institution in many strategic-form games, the most likely culprits—and the avenues of 
approach taken by researchers—are the other two. In the environment, subjects’ 
preferences may differ from those the experimenter intended to induce. The ways in 
which they differ may vary, from a concern for others’ payoffs to other (perhaps exotic) 
utility functions that account for the sign of a payoff or order statistics (Becker 1974, 
Rabin 1993, Cox et al. 2008, Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Quiggin 1982). Apparent 
failures of Nash predictions under these circumstances might instead be a result of poor 
tests of the theory—if preferences are misspecified or unknown by researchers, then the 
predictive power of a theory that requires preferences to make its predictions becomes 
very difficult to test. 
On the other hand, preferences may be correctly specified and induced, in the 
sense that subjects rank outcomes in the intended fashion. Even under these conditions, a 
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long line of research posits (and confirms) that people diverge from rational behavior in a 
number of ways. Subjects may, for example, iterate toward a maximum, but not achieve 
the limit; they may systematically edit information to reduce cognitive costs; they may 
misapprehend probability, minimize regret, or choose with error (Hey and Orme 1994, 
Stahl and Wilson 1995, Nagel 1995, McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, Holt and Laury 2002, 
Halpern and Pass 2008). 
The present paper follows in the behavior-focused line in the introduction of two 
new strategic concepts—the détente concept and the no-initiative concept—in 
simultaneous games. We will argue that détente and no-initiative are often preferable on 
grounds both normative, in that agents can improve efficiency, and positive, in that these 
concepts describe observed behavior. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a discussion of internal 
correlation, and some possible psychological and normative bases for these concepts, as 
well as some properties of strategic concepts. Section 3 presents the definitions of two 
strategic concepts that satisfy these properties, Section 4 discusses some implications in 
commonly studied two-player simultaneous games, and Section 5 concludes with a 
discussion of these concepts and some thoughts on future developments. 
Theory of Mind, the Categorical Imperative, and Agents 
From the outset, game theory has relied on the intuition that the player faced with 
a game is aware that there is another player in similar circumstances; there is another 
person playing the game. This separates choice in a game from choice under uncertainty. 
It is a unique, albeit ordinary, situation, as people have well-developed faculties for 
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constructing propositions about others’ inferences when in circumstances similar to our 
own: we predict how people will act.  
In many cases, a unilateral deviation undermines the justification for the Nash 
strategy for other players in the game. Under any of a number of deviations, agents may 
be better off playing a different strategy, and where no unilateral deviation may be 
profitable for the deviator, multilateral deviations may lead to economically significant 
efficiency improvements. While external correlation devices or repetition may offer one 
means of increasing efficiency, the similarity between agents—and resulting self-
reflection—may itself provide a source of strategic correlation of reasoning. Considering 
the evolution of humans within groups, it may be ecologically rational to take advantage 
of this correlation, even if the underlying presumptions are not themselves traditionally 
rational. Consider two examples: agents’ reasoning may be correlated due to common 
internal models of the other, or it may be correlated due to common internalized social 
norms. 
The philosophical and psychological literature has developed the concept of 
―theory of mind‖ (Baron-Cohen 1997, Carruthers and Smith 1996). In essence, 
individuals possess a model of others which allows them to postulate behavior.
17
 In 
practice, this modeling process usually includes quite a bit of sensory evidence about a 
specific other; in the absence of other evidence, agents may regard their own thought 
process as a good predictor of others’ thought processes, using this as a coordinating 
device. As Aumann (1987) argues, ―The player is not really conditioning on his choice, 
                                                 
17
 The question of whether this process is the result of a simulation module or a working internal theory of 
mind—which might matter in a more comprehensive model of strategic behavior—is the topic of no small 
debate with the psychological literature, although a number of people, including Carruthers (1996) and 
Mitchell (2005) have argued for a synthesis of the two. For more, see Carruthers and Smith (1996). 
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but on the substantive information that leads him to make this choice.‖ This ―substantive 
information‖ should include not only a description of the game, but also a working model 
of other players. Nash equilibrium relies on models of others as myopically self-
interested and individually rational to establish its results. Rationalizability relies on 
models of others as plausible—dominated strategies are never played or posited to be 
played. In analyzing a game, agents may realize that the Nash equilibrium solution is 
inferior, and that a mutual deviation provides mutual benefit. Alternatively, they may not 
be aware of the Nash equilibrium concept, and may instead search under some other 
criterion. If this process itself is correlated, then agents may make a separate but 
correlated decision to approach the problem differently.
18
 
Another rationale for not playing a Nash strategy profile is the belief that one 
should abandon that behavior. Ethicists throughout history—Kant, Jesus, Bentham—have 
argued that self-interest should be replaced with something: other-regarding preferences 
or even merely ―enlightened‖ self-interest, wherein we escape traps by moving past 
myopic self-interest and trusting that others will do the same—particularly if it is to our 
mutual benefit. This trust may be innate—subjects have been selected from a social 
species—or acquired—subjects are active, living members of a complex, functioning 
society of interdependent people.
19
 
                                                 
18
 This is clearly different from an external device used to select particular strategies, but it changes 
expected payoffs to particular strategies. Instead, agents may use their model of the other’s mind to provide 
sufficient belief for abandoning a particularly inferior Nash equilibrium profile in favor of another 
approach. A different approach than the one taken in this paper might examine the ways in which prior 
belief might be shifted due to internal correlation. 
19
 Widespread rejection in ultimatum games, such as is visible in Henrich et al. 2001, is consistent with the 
hypothesis that pro-social norms are reinforced with varying degrees of severity across cultures. It may be 
the case that Pareto-inferior Nash deviations serve as costly signals to support a norm that encourages 
Pareto-improving Nash deviations in other simultaneous games. 
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In some games, people should violate Nash predictions, as groups of violators can 
sometimes be made better off, and in practice, people do violate such predictions. These 
types of agents are not classically rational, but a population of such agents might achieve 
higher levels of utility. We turn now to a proposal of what such agents might look like. 
Modeling agents 
When evaluating a profile, agents consider only counterfactual profiles that 
satisfy ―feasibility under opponent rationality.‖ When considering deviations from a 
given strategy profile, agents presume that other agents are at least as insightful and 
flexible as they are. They consider only those strategy profiles resulting from bi- or 
multilateral strategic changes, rather than considering a strategy profile involving a 
unilateral strategic change. Consequently, agents only consider those counterfactual 
profiles in which opponents are playing best response strategies.  In this paper, we 
constrain players’ consideration to bilateral strategic changes. 
Agents are limited in their depth of reasoning—they engage in finite (but 
nonzero) steps of inference when evaluating alternative strategies.
20
 These agents, then, 
are boundedly rational. The experimental evidence recommends the number of iterations 
to be 1-2 (Nagel 1995). In this paper, we constrain agents to consider two iterations—
their own strategic change and their opponent’s best response to the strategic change. 
Stemming from the limited depth of reasoning, agents use a neighborhood 
heuristic—if iteration leads to inferior outcomes, agents cut off the iteration process and 
―settle.‖ The possible existence of search costs implies that strategy profiles that offer 
                                                 
20
 Nagel (1995) estimates that the optimal and model level of steps is about 2: best reply to best reply to a 
uniform distribution. Stahl and Wilson (1995) consider a number of levels of inference and reject a ―perfect 
foresight‖ type model. 
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local maxima when compared to 1-2 iterations might be preferred to an uncertain, 
perhaps nonexistent, improvement requiring further iteration. One way to consider Nash 
equilibrium is that it represents a maximal neighborhood heuristic (as many iterations as 
necessary to achieve a steady state). This particular heuristic lies at the heart of the 
strategic concepts contained herein. Détente strategic profiles and no-initiative strategic 
profiles are in equilibrium with respect to a ―move-countermove‖ neighborhood heuristic. 
The distinction between the détente concept and the no-initiative concept is 
related to a distinction between two potential properties of the agents. The first is ―best 
response focus,‖ in which agents consider only best responses to opponents’ strategies 
when evaluating a strategy profile. This carries intuitive appeal as potentially satisfying 
ecological rationality. It seems likely that naturally occurring payoffs accruing to a 
particular strategy might be positively correlated, which is to say: some actions in life are 
―good ideas‖ and others are ―bad ideas‖ across large subsets of other players’ actions. 
Détente profiles satisfy best response focus. 
The alternative property is ―flexibility.‖ Under flexibility, agents are not bound to 
play best response if another strategy would yield a higher payoff, given previous 
assumptions; agents compare all possible strategies when assessing a strategy profile. 
This is satisfying with respect to profile selection, as a profile that is robust to flexibility 
passes a particularly strict robustness test. It also reduces the multiplicity of predicted 
outcomes. No-initiative profiles satisfy flexibility. 
Properties of strategic concepts 
A useful strategic concept, for both descriptive and normative purposes, should 
allow dominated strategies to be played if efficiency gains can be achieved. Evidence 
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from experiments indicates that any concept that eliminates all dominant strategies is 
going to eliminate played strategies: Becker et al. (2005) present evidence that 
experienced players selected dominated strategies 20% of the time in the Traveler’s 
Dilemma. As discussed earlier, Frank et al. (1993) find that participants in a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game with nonbinding communication chose dominated strategies between 
39% (economics undergraduates) and 60% (other majors) of the time. Both the détente 
concept and the no-initiative concept allow dominated strategies. 
The efficiency of strategic concepts is also of primary interest. If the concept is to 
be supported on normative grounds, it should offer agents a chance to improve on Nash 
equilibrium. In the next section, we show that in 2x2 normal-form games that contain 
both a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and a détente strategic profile, a détente strategic 
profile is always weakly preferred by some player to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
We also show that any two-player game that contains both a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium and a no-initiative strategic profile, all players will weakly prefer all no-
initiative strategic profiles to all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 
Finally, one of the goals of the introduction of these strategic concepts is their 
descriptive power. A descriptive strategic concept should coincide with subject behavior, 
particularly in cases where Nash equilibrium fails. After dealing with the formal 
definitions of the concepts and some of their properties, we provide some evidence of 
their descriptive power from existing experimental results. 
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Détente and No-Initiative Strategic Concepts 
Let us be given a strategic form game            . For our purposes, we will 
confine ourselves to the two-player case. N is the set of all players        ,       is 
player i's strategy,    is the strategy set for player  ,         is the set of strategy 
profiles          ,      the other player’s strategy, and           is the set of 
payoff functions        , player i's payoff to profile s. Let   
       or   
     represent 
player i's best response to the strategy     chosen by the other player, that is: 
     
            
             
    
     
    
     
Define the détente alternative profile  for player i to the strategy profile s,        as 
the strategy profile consisting of i's best response to     and the counter-response: 
          
          
    
          
Define i's initiative-response set of strategy profiles with respect to a given 
strategy profile as the set of profiles in which i’s opponent is playing a best-response to 
i’s strategy:   
            
     
    
    
    
  
 
Definition 1. A strategy profile             is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no 
unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player is profitable for that player, that is: 
     
       
                     
       
Definition 2. A strategy profile             is a strict Nash equilibrium 
(SNE) if any unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player would reduce the payoff 
for that player, that is: 
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Definition 3. A strategy profile             is détente strategic (DS) if the 
payoff to each player from s is greater or equal to that of the détente alternative profile: 
                   
          
    
          
Definition 4. A strategy profile             is no-initiative strategic
21
 (NIS) if 
the payoff to each player from the strategy profile is greater than or equal to that from 
each profile in his initiative-response set for the strategy profile: 
     
                     
     
    
     
To illustrate these concepts, let us consider the 3x3 game in Figure 18. This game 
has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profile:                . In addition it 
has four détente strategic profiles and three no-initiative strategic profiles. Looking at 
       , we can see that it does indeed satisfy the détente strategic definition: The row 
player gets a payoff of 3 from the strategy profile:          . If he considers his best 
response,   
         , and the counter-response,    
         , we can see that 
his utility from the détente alternative profile is                  , so he has no 
incentive to deviate. This is a symmetric game, so the reasoning for the column player is 
identical, and thus         is détente strategic. 
                                                 
21
 The intuition behind the nomenclature I’m using here is that détente equilibrium assumes something akin 
to a Mexican standoff—players can only respond by employing a best reply (firing the pistol in the 
Mexican standoff), but because the consequences thereafter would be utility-reducing for all parties 
involved, no one wants to pull the trigger first. If both sides are aware of the tension, the détente concept 
―solves‖ this problem by easing the tension, achieving a détente. 
In the case of no-initiative equilibria, players can choose not only (to continue the metaphor) to 
unilaterally fire, but also to unilaterally put down their guns (or do a little dance, sing ―The Yellow Rose of 
Texas,‖ or anything else in their action set if they think they can win their opponents over), and so a profile 
is no-initiative when no player has an incentive to take the initiative in any sense, not just in the ―shooting 
first‖ sense. 
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The strategy profile (4,4) is also no-initiative strategic. The profile (3,3) on the 
other hand, while it is DS, is not no-initiative strategic. We can see this by looking at a 
posited change from s = 3 for the row player to s = 4. For both players, the best response  
 2 3 4 
2 1,1
#*
 4,0 3,0 
3 0,4 1,1
#
 4,2
#!
 
4 0,3 2,4
#!
 3,3
#!
 
 
*: Nash equilibrium, #: Détente profile, !: No-initiative profile 
Figure 18. Nash equilibrium, détente strategic, and no-initiative strategic profiles in a 
two-player game 
to a strategy of 3 is to choose a strategy of 2, but by allowing the players to be flexible, 
we can see that the row player’s payoff to (3,3) is 1. If the row player considers a change 
to     , and he predicts that the column player will foresee this and play a best 
response:   
      , then we can see that his utility from the new profile is         
         , and so the row player has an incentive to deviate from the strategy profile 
(3,3): this profile is not NIS. There is no strategic change from (4,3), however, that will 
provide an improved payoff for either player, if they believe their opponent will play a 
best response to their altered strategy: this is a NIS profile. 
Nash equilibrium, the détente concept, and the no-initiative concept all rely on the 
idea that a given strategy profile provides at least as great a payoff to each individual than 
that of any other profile in a particular subset of S. In particular, a NE profile provides at 
least as great a payoff than all those strategy profiles in which i’s strategy varies, but the 
other player’s strategy is held constant. A DS profile provides at least as great a payoff to 
each player i than that strategy profile in which i’s strategy is a best response to his 
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opponent’s strategy, and his opponent’s modified strategy represents the posited counter-
response to i’s best response. A NIS profile provides at least as great a payoff as all those 
strategy profiles in which i’s strategy is varied, and his opponent’s strategy is the posited 
counter-response to the modified strategy profile. 
The differences, then, stem from the counterfactuals that players consider when 
making a decision. The détente concept shares characteristics with k-step thinking 
models, in that agents are posited to have insight into the behavior of their opponents 
with limited powers of induction; in this case, agents are symmetric in that they possess 
the same depth of inference. One possible way to consider agents is that they all believe 
that their opponents have one additional level of inference.  
These concepts are all similar in that they rely on agents seeking to make 
themselves better off. The following results formally establish relationships between 
these strategic concepts and Nash equilibrium. The results are presented here; the proofs 
can be found in Appendix F. 
 
Result 1: Every strict Nash equilibrium profile is détente strategic. 
 
If the strategy profile is a strict Nash equilibrium, then the current strategy    is 
the unique best response to the set of other players’ strategies,    , for each player i, so 
clearly each player weakly prefers the profile to itself.  
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Result 2: Every no-initiative strategic profile is détente strategic. 
 
A strategy profile is no-initiative strategic if there exists no alternative strategy   
  
for any player such that the counter-response to the modified strategy profile    
       
provides a greater payoff to the player. The détente concept requires that this be true only 
of alternative strategies that are themselves best responses to a given set of opponents’ 
strategies. 
 
Result 3(a): There are profiles that are DS but neither NE nor NIS. 
3(b): There are profiles that are NE but not NIS, and NIS but not NE. 
 
These results are visible in Figure 18.  
 
Result 4: In any 2x2 game with both a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profile and 
a détente strategic profile, at least one player weakly prefers the détente 
strategic profile to some pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profile. 
 
If there is both a DS profile and a NE profile in a 2x2 game, there must be some 
NE profile such that the NE profile does not represent an actual Pareto improvement over 
the DS profile. The next result, however, illustrates the efficiency of NIS profiles relative 
to NE profiles. 
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Result 5: In any game with both a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profile and a 
no-initiative strategic profile, both players weakly prefer all no-initiative 
strategic profiles to all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profiles. 
 
This result has particular appeal, in that it indicates that in two-player games, NIS 
profiles are at least as efficient as pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profiles.  
Détente and No-Initiative in Two-Player Games 
Conflict games 
There are 57 2x2 purely ordinal ―conflict games‖ in which there is no mutually 
preferred outcome and no indifference (Brams 1994). Of these games, 41 have a unique 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In 35 of these 41, the unique NE profile is both DS and 
NIS. Figure 19 displays the three purely ordinal conflict games with a unique NE and a 
unique NIS profile which diverge. Worth noting is that in all three cases, the NIS profile 
requires that the row player play a dominated strategy, and that if players can 
successfully coordinate in the face of domination, then a Pareto improvement can be 
achieved—the Nash trap can be evaded. 
 L R   L R   L R 
U 2,3
#*
 4,1  U 2,2
#*
 4,1  U 2,3
#*
 4,2 
D 1,2 3,4
#!
  D 1,3 3,4
#!
  D 1,1 3,4
#!
 
 
*: Nash equilibrium, #: Détente profile, !: No-initiative profile 
Figure 19. Purely ordinal conflict games with different NE and NIS profiles 
78 
 
Social dilemmas 
Figure 20 presents results for the Prisoner’s Dilemma and an abbreviated version 
of the Traveler’s Dilemma (Basu 1994). In both games, there is a unique pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium (indeed, these games are dominance solvable). In the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, both the Nash equilibrium profile of (Confess, Confess) and the Pareto optimal 
profile, (Deny, Deny), are détente strategic and no-initiative strategic. One drawback of 
détente is that it is, in some cases, not very restrictive. Much like Nash equilibrium, 
détente suffers from multiplicity. In both the Prisoner’s and Traveler’s Dilemma’s, for 
example, every available strategy falls into a détente strategy profile. One approach to 
improve descriptive power is to refine the détente concept. No-initiative serves as a 
restriction on détente in this fashion. As the Traveler’s Dilemma is expanded, the 
distance between the NE and the set of NIS strategy profiles grows.
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In the full (99x99) Traveler’s Dilemma, the set of NIS profiles includes six 
strategy profiles, four symmetric, and two asymmetric: {(97,97), (98,98), (99,99), 
(99,100), (100,99), (100,100)}. Becker et al. (2005) present behavior of game theorists in 
the Traveler’s Dilemma. Of the 51 entries they received, 45 played pure strategies; their 
reported subject behavior is displayed in Table 9. While their procedure and sample 
render the results perhaps illustrative at best, only ~6% of their subjects played the Nash 
strategy, while nearly 20% played the dominated strategy s100, and 55% of their subjects 
chose strategies within NIS profiles. Becker et al. choose to model s100 players as 
―irrational cooperators,‖ but the concepts of détente and no-initiative support s100 players 
in fully half the no-initiative profiles. 
                                                 
22
 The characteristic shape remains the same: the NIS profiles make a ―kite‖ shape in the lower right corner, 
while DS profiles represent a 7x7 swath along the diagonal from (4, 4) down to (smax, smax). 
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 Confess Deny 
Confess 2,2
#!*
 4,1 
Deny 1,4 3,3
#!
 
 
*: Nash equilibrium, #: Détente profile, !: No-initiative profile 
 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
2 2,2
#*
 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 
3 0,4 3,3
#
 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 
4 0,4 1,5 4,4
#
 6,2
#
 6,2
#
 6,2
#
 6,2
#
 6,2
#
 6,2
#
 6,2 
5 0,4 1,5 2,6
#
 5,5
#
 7,3
#
 7,3
#
 7,3
#
 7,3
#
 7,3
#
 7,3
#
 
6 0,4 1,5 2,6
#
 3,7
#
 6,6
#
 8,4
#
 8,4
#
 8,4
#
 8,4
#
 8,4
#
 
7 0,4 1,5 2,6
#
 3,7
#
 4,8
#
 7,7
#
 9,5
#
 9,5
#
 9,5
#
 9,5
#
 
8 0,4 1,5 2,6
#
 3,7
#
 4,8
#
 5,9
#
 8,8
#!
 10,6
#
 10,6
#
 10,6
#
 
9 0,4 1,5 2,6
#
 3,7
#
 4,8
#
 5,9
#
 6,10
#
 9,9
#!
 11,7
#
 11,7
#
 
10 0,4 1,5 2,6
#
 3,7
#
 4,8
#
 5,9
#
 6,10
#
 7,11
#
 10,10
#!
 12,8
#!
 
11 0,4 1,5 2,6 3,7
#
 4,8
#
 5,9
#
 6,10
#
 7,11
#
 8,12
#!
 11,11
#!
 
 
*: Nash equilibrium, #: Détente profile, !: No-initiative profile 
Figure 20. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and an abbreviated Traveler’s Dilemma 
Table 9. Subject behavior in the Traveler’s Dilemma 
Taken from Becker et al. (2005), Table 1. 
Strategy Entries Strategy Entries Strategy Entries 
2 3 88 1 96 3 
4 1 90 1 97 6 
31 1 93 1 98 9 
49 1 94 2 99 3 
70 1 95 2 100 10 
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Furthermore, Becker et al. elicited beliefs and over 50% of the 47 belief 
respondents believed (correctly) that subjects would play a strategy of 96 or greater. In 
addition, game theorists exhibited a pronounced lack of classical rationality: only 36% of 
subjects played a best response to their stated belief, and as mentioned above, nearly 20% 
of subjects chose s100, the only dominated strategy. 
Constant-sum games 
In constant-sum games, the concepts of détente and no-initiative can offer no 
efficiency gains. In some cases, they provide little predictive power, although in many of 
these cases pure-strategy NE profiles are either multiple or nonexistent as well. In 
Matching Pennies, for example, as well as the game presented to subjects in O’Neill 
(1987), every strategy profile is both détente and no-initiative, while no pure-strategy 
profile is a Nash equilibrium. In the 13 basic 2x2 constant-sum games, every game has at 
least one profile that is NIS. In 3 cases, there is a unique profile that is DS and NIS—in 
all three cases this is also the unique pure-strategy NE profile. In 5 cases, 2 of the 4 
profiles are DS and NIS. As one of the primary benefits of these concepts is Pareto 
improvement, and all strategy profiles are equally efficient in any zero-sum game, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the predictive power of these concepts is limited in these 
games. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has introduced two strategic concepts, détente and no-initiative, that 
characterize strategy profiles in normal-form games that might be reached by particular 
types of agents. These concepts represent a formal justification for the consideration of 
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strategy profiles that improve on Nash equilibrium profiles in terms of efficiency, and, 
we argue, predictive power. These concepts allow play of dominated strategies, which 
excludes them from the set of ―solutions‖ as defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
but may more accurately represent observed behavior. 
As Aumann (1974) showed, it is possible to achieve efficiency gains through 
external correlation. By the similar nature of agents playing games, it may be possible to 
coordinate on Nash deviations to achieve efficiency gains through either an internal 
model of the other person, or shared external norms—including the willingness to play a 
dominated strategy if it is possible to improve efficiency. 
The détente concept is attractive in that it is roughly a generalization of Nash 
equilibrium, allowing for the possibility of an additional level of sophistication on the 
part of agents. As a consequence, however, it restricts the set of strategy profiles for 
consideration even less than does the Nash concept. The no-initiative concept is a 
refinement of détente that allows for more flexible fictional play, and consequently 
reduces the set of strategy profiles considerably. In addition, in two-player games, the no-
initiative concept always recommends strategy profiles at least as efficient as any existing 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profiles. 
In social dilemmas, these concepts provide significant predictive power over Nash 
equilibrium; in other games, the evidence is mixed. In many cases, the predictions align. 
The predictive power of détente and no-initiative is diminished in some constant-sum 
games, but the lack of the opportunity for efficiency gains limits their usefulness in 
constant-sum games in any case. 
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This discussion has focused exclusively on pure strategies in two-player 
simultaneous games. Further research should expand these concepts to mixed strategies, 
n-player games, and sequential play. It may also be the case that some people play in 
ways predicted by Nash while others play strategies that are détente or no-initiative. 
Further analysis of experimental results may improve our ability to discriminate between 
the two. 
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Appendix A. Subject Instructions for the Pigovian Subsidy Experiment 
[The instructions, as viewed by subjects, were presented as part of the computer interface 
and were formatted as a webpage. As a result, there were no page breaks and the spacing 
and leading were slightly different than in the example below.] 
This is an experiment about decision making. You will be paid for participating, and the 
amount of money you earn depends on the decisions that you and the other participants 
make. At the end of the session, you will be paid privately and in cash for your decisions.  
 Privacy and Anonymity 
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the 
experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to 
keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant. 
 Your Key and Your Payment 
All the money that you earn will be yours to keep, and your earnings will be paid to you 
IN CASH at the end of the experiment. 
 At this time, you will be given a key with a number on it. After you have finished 
reading the instructions, you will be asked to enter the number on your key into the 
computer. 
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 IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT YOU ENTER YOUR KEY NUMBER 
CORRECTLY,  
AS THIS NUMBER WILL BE LINKED TO YOUR PAYMENT. 
 At the end of the experiment, we will place payment in a locked box which your key will 
open. We will call you out of the room, one by one, to open your box anonymously, 
retrieve your earnings, and deposit your key.  
 This Experiment 
In this experiment you will be asked to make a series of decisions about how to invest a 
set of tokens. You and the other subjects will be randomly assigned into groups and you 
will not be told each others’ identities. 
 There will be three people in your group—you and two others. 
 In each period, each of you will have ten (10) tokens to invest. You can invest these in 
either a RED investment or a BLUE investment. The amount of money you earn depends 
upon how many tokens you decide to invest in the RED investment or the BLUE 
investment, as well as how many tokens others decide to invest in the RED investment or 
the BLUE investment. 
 In each decision you make, tokens in the RED investment will pay a fixed amount per 
token, and tokens in the BLUE investment will pay an amount that depends on the 
number of tokens invested in the BLUE investment by you and the other members of 
group. The value of each token in the BLUE investment is high when people invest small 
85 
 
numbers of tokens in BLUE, and decreases as people invest more tokens in BLUE. For 
example, if 1 token is invested in BLUE, that token might be worth $0.50. If 2 tokens are 
invested in BLUE, each might be worth $0.47. If 3 tokens are invested in BLUE, each 
might be worth $0.44. In this example, tokens in BLUE begin at a value of $0.50 per 
token and decrease in value at a rate of $0.03 per token for every additional token 
invested. No token ever pays less than $0.00, which is to say, you can never lose money 
from a token. In this example, if more than 17 tokens are invested in BLUE, all tokens 
invested in BLUE will have a value of $0.00. 
 To summarize: 
• In each period, you will have ten (10) tokens. 
• Your task, in each period, is to decide how many of your tokens to invest in the 
RED investment and how many to invest in the BLUE investment. 
• In each period, you will earn a fixed amount for each token you invest in the RED 
investment. 
• You may earn money for each token you invest in the BLUE investment—the 
actual amount you earn for each token you invest depends on your and everyone 
else in your group’s decision to invest in the BLUE investment. 
Earning money in this experiment 
You will be asked to make twenty-one (21) investment decisions like the example we 
have just discussed. At the end of the experiment, whatever money you have earned will 
be yours to keep.  
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As an example of how money is earned, assume that: 
• Tokens invested the RED investment pay $0.05 per token. 
• Tokens invested in the BLUE investment begin at a value of $0.50 per token and 
decrease in value at a rate of $0.03 per token for every additional token invested. 
 You will make a decision about how to invest your ten tokens. 
   
Example 1: If you invest 6 tokens in RED and 4 tokens in BLUE, and the other members 
of your group combine to invest 3 tokens in BLUE, then your earnings will be calculated 
as follows: 
Each token in RED pays $0.05. 
 There are 7 tokens invested in BLUE in total, combining your decision with the 
rest of the group’s decisions. Each token in BLUE begins at $0.50, and then for 
each token invested after the first one, decreases by $0.03 per token. So each 
token in BLUE pays $0.50 – 6 * ($0.03) = $0.50 - $0.18  
In this case, each token in BLUE pays $0.32.  
You earn $0.05 * 6 = $0.30 for your RED tokens, $0.32 * 4 = $1.28 for your 
BLUE tokens, so your total earnings for the round are:  
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$0.30 + $1.28 = $1.58. 
  
Example 2: If you decide to invest 2 tokens in RED and 8 tokens in BLUE, and the other 
members of your group combine to invest 17 tokens in BLUE, then your earnings will be 
calculated as follows:  
Each token in RED pays $0.05.  
There are 25 tokens invested in BLUE in total, combining your decision with the 
rest of the group’s decisions. Each token in BLUE begins at $0.50, and then for 
each token invested after the first one, decreases by $0.03 per token. So each 
token in BLUE is worth $0.50 – 24 * ($0.03) = $0.50 - $0.72 = -$0.22.   
Because this is less than zero, in this case, each token in BLUE pays = $0.00.  
You would earn $0.05 * 2 = $0.10 for your RED tokens, $0.00 * 8 = $0.00 for 
your BLUE tokens, so your total earnings for the round are:  
$0.10 + $0.00 = $0.10 
 To figure out by hand how much each token will pay during the game can take a long 
time. To help you with this, a calculator is provided as part of the computer program. 
This calculator shows the amount you will earn, assuming that you invest a certain 
number of tokens in the BLUE investment and assuming that your group combines to 
invest a certain number of tokens in the BLUE investment. You will have an opportunity 
88 
 
to practice using the calculator before you make any decisions that will determine your 
payment. 
 After each choice, the decision you have made and the decision the other members of 
your group have made will be tallied, and your earnings will be determined. You will be 
informed of your earnings for the round. You will then have an opportunity to review the 
decision you made, the decision made by the other members of your group, and your 
earnings for the round. 
 The Computer Interface 
In the experiment, you will be making decisions on the computer screen. This section of 
the instructions will briefly introduce and explain the parts of the program. After you 
complete the instructions, you will have an opportunity to practice making decisions 
before any of your decisions will be counted for payment. 
 The screen you will see will look like the one below. 
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You will use the slide-bar in the upper left to decide how to invest your tokens. As you 
move the slider on the slide-bar, the tokens you see will change. In the image above, it 
says ―I have decided to invest 6 tokens in RED and 4 tokens in BLUE.‖ Use the slider to 
make your decision, and then click that button to submit your investment choice for the 
period. 
 Below the decision slider is the Calculator. The Calculator will tell you what your 
earnings for the period will be if you submit your decision, depending on what the other 
members of your group decide. As you move the sliders or enter numbers in the text 
boxes, the contents of the Calculator will change. In each case, the table will tell you 
what your earnings for the period will be under different choices by your group members. 
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 In the example above, the Calculator is being used to predict what the profit would be for 
a decision of 4 tokens in BLUE, assuming that the rest of the group combines to invest 9 
tokens in BLUE.  
 In the upper right corner, you will see messages that change depending on what you are 
currently doing. While you are making your decision, the message will tell you what the 
value of the tokens are. While you are reviewing your decision and earnings, the message 
will tell you what you earned in the round and what your total earnings are. 
 The table at the right of the screen contains the decisions you’ve made in previous 
rounds, your earnings for those rounds, as well as your total earnings. 
 Questions 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come by to 
answer your question privately. 
 When you are finished reading these instructions, click OK below. Once you have 
finished reading the instructions, you will have an opportunity to practice using the 
computer screen. 
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Appendix C. Estimates of Per-Capita Expenditure Need by State 
State 
Hybrid State Barebones Traditional Actual 
Need Rank Need Rank Need Rank Need Rank Need Rank 
Alaska $8,177 1 $9,226 1 $7,305 1 $5,995 21 $13,418 1 
Hawaii $6,767 2 $6,938 3 $6,079 33 $5,216 50 $6,828 7 
Wyoming $6,564 3 $6,534 4 $6,313 6 $5,894 23 $7,677 4 
Minnesota $6,560 4 $6,274 11 $6,130 17 $5,553 45 $7,052 5 
Connecticut $6,448 5 $6,199 15 $5,906 42 $5,772 31 $6,789 9 
California $6,434 6 $6,335 6 $5,998 51 $6,211 13 $6,933 6 
New Mexico $6,364 7 $6,303 9 $6,257 3 $6,052 20 $6,225 14 
Oregon $6,282 8 $6,277 10 $6,155 11 $5,605 40 $6,576 10 
New Jersey $6,280 9 $6,043 30 $5,817 48 $5,797 29 $6,094 16 
New York $6,247 10 $6,327 7 $5,877 50 $6,460 5 $8,486 3 
District of Columbia $6,223 11 $7,880 2 $5,992 35 -- -- $10,802 2 
Montana $6,212 12 $6,365 5 $6,414 2 $5,798 28 $5,550 32 
Washington $6,211 13 $6,310 8 $6,091 23 $5,791 30 $6,468 12 
Maryland $6,199 14 $6,123 23 $6,001 43 $5,688 35 $6,024 20 
Illinois $6,193 15 $6,140 19 $6,014 44 $6,126 17 $5,887 22 
Michigan $6,188 16 $6,125 22 $6,068 41 $6,255 10 $6,079 18 
Nevada $6,174 17 $6,251 12 $6,206 5 $5,489 48 $5,732 27 
Idaho $6,174 18 $6,096 26 $6,254 8 $5,880 24 $5,034 46 
Iowa $6,102 19 $5,998 32 $6,168 18 $5,491 47 $5,683 29 
Rhode Island $6,100 20 $6,152 18 $6,069 37 $5,603 41 $6,091 17 
North Dakota $6,061 21 $6,179 16 $6,212 13 $6,113 18 $5,866 24 
Virginia $6,049 22 $5,988 34 $6,066 40 $5,764 32 $5,400 35 
Nebraska $6,041 23 $6,058 27 $6,206 14 $5,619 37 $5,631 30 
Maine $6,037 24 $6,098 25 $6,108 22 $5,593 42 $5,734 26 
Vermont $6,030 25 $6,227 14 $6,100 29 $5,493 46 $6,041 19 
Oklahoma $6,012 26 $6,163 17 $6,157 16 $6,059 19 $5,109 45 
Ohio $6,001 27 $5,945 37 $6,078 46 $5,814 27 $5,772 25 
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State 
Hybrid State Barebones Traditional Actual 
Need Rank Need Rank Need Rank Need Rank Need Rank 
Delaware $5,999 28 $6,045 29 $6,032 34 $5,557 44 $6,797 8 
South Dakota $5,994 29 $6,114 24 $6,252 10 $6,291 8 $4,990 48 
Massachusetts $5,992 30 $6,134 21 $6,020 45 $5,709 34 $6,562 11 
Utah $5,982 31 $6,021 31 $6,137 12 $6,181 14 $5,708 28 
Arizona $5,981 32 $6,139 20 $6,114 7 $6,128 16 $5,004 47 
Georgia $5,979 33 $5,885 41 $6,099 36 $6,297 7 $5,617 31 
West Virginia $5,978 34 $5,820 44 $6,111 26 $6,227 12 $5,282 41 
Kansas $5,971 35 $5,948 36 $6,195 15 $5,846 25 $5,498 34 
Indiana $5,961 36 $5,891 39 $6,081 38 $5,908 22 $5,228 43 
Colorado $5,958 37 $6,245 13 $6,126 9 $5,610 38 $6,159 15 
Wisconsin $5,957 38 $5,886 40 $6,113 25 $5,566 43 $6,328 13 
Missouri $5,953 39 $5,975 35 $6,132 20 $5,816 26 $4,985 50 
New Hampshire $5,908 40 $5,997 33 $6,031 30 $5,282 49 $5,116 44 
Florida $5,894 41 $6,053 28 $6,068 49 $5,666 36 $5,360 36 
Pennsylvania $5,889 42 $5,892 38 $6,060 47 $5,609 39 $5,883 23 
Texas $5,884 43 $5,766 47 $6,166 4 $6,456 6 $5,260 42 
Tennessee $5,744 44 $5,865 43 $6,105 32 $6,271 9 $4,987 49 
North Carolina $5,737 45 $5,774 46 $6,102 39 $6,248 11 $5,510 33 
Kentucky $5,733 46 $5,882 42 $6,125 28 $6,141 15 $5,314 37 
South Carolina $5,682 47 $5,747 48 $6,096 31 $5,745 33 $5,903 21 
Arkansas $5,631 48 $5,689 49 $6,154 19 $6,539 3 $4,746 51 
Louisiana $5,548 49 $5,781 45 $6,102 27 $6,631 2 $5,287 40 
Alabama $5,448 50 $5,558 51 $6,115 24 $6,492 4 $5,308 38 
Mississippi $5,442 51 $5,672 50 $6,162 21 $6,800 1 $5,296 39 
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Appendix D. Estimates of Per-Capita Expenditure Need by Sub-State Area 
Name 
Hybrid Actual Difference 
Need Rank Need Rank Amount Rank 
Alaska - Rural $7,857 1 $13,694 1 $5,837 1 
Anchorage, AK MSA $7,768 2 $13,029 2 $5,261 2 
Massachusetts - Rural $7,096 3 $10,010 3 $2,914 3 
Fresno, CA MSA $6,983 4 $6,821 37 -$162 170 
Visalia--Tulare--Porterville, CA MSA $6,925 5 $7,850 7 $925 36 
Merced, CA MSA $6,893 6 $7,042 24 $149 120 
Bakersfield, CA MSA $6,783 7 $7,680 10 $897 40 
McAllen--Edinburg--Mission, TX MSA $6,758 8 $5,343 195 -$1,415 320 
Hawaii - Rural $6,751 9 $7,014 25 $263 101 
Laredo, TX MSA $6,644 10 $5,894 118 -$750 271 
Redding, CA MSA $6,604 11 $6,663 51 $59 132 
California - Rural $6,558 12 $6,944 30 $386 89 
Brownsville--Harlingen--San Benito, TX MSA $6,506 13 $5,234 211 -$1,272 314 
Stockton--Lodi, CA MSA $6,477 14 $6,841 36 $364 92 
Wyoming - Rural $6,435 15 $7,951 5 $1,516 12 
Chico--Paradise, CA MSA $6,421 16 $6,338 71 -$83 154 
Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN--WI MSA $6,412 17 $7,222 17 $810 48 
Yuba City, CA MSA $6,389 18 $6,508 59 $119 123 
Honolulu, HI MSA $6,364 19 $6,757 40 $393 87 
Hartford, CT MSA $6,340 20 $6,427 66 $87 126 
New Mexico - Rural $6,307 21 $6,265 78 -$42 147 
Modesto, CA MSA $6,305 22 $6,712 47 $407 83 
Yakima, WA MSA $6,304 23 $5,942 113 -$362 216 
Sacramento--Yolo, CA CMSA $6,302 24 $7,012 26 $710 54 
Rochester, MN MSA $6,225 25 $6,875 33 $650 60 
Utah - Rural $6,219 26 $6,121 93 -$98 159 
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Name 
Hybrid Actual Difference 
Need Rank Need Rank Amount Rank 
Rochester, NY MSA $6,205 27 $7,374 14 $1,169 24 
Richland--Kennewick--Pasco, WA MSA $6,190 28 $6,183 87 -$7 140 
Colorado - Rural $6,185 29 $6,741 41 $556 65 
El Paso, TX MSA $6,176 30 $5,248 208 -$928 294 
Los Angeles--Riverside--Orange County, CA CMSA $6,149 31 $6,722 44 $573 63 
Arizona - Rural $6,145 32 $4,672 291 -$1,473 321 
Minnesota - Rural $6,131 33 $6,732 42 $601 61 
New London--Norwich, CT--RI MSA $6,120 34 $7,533 11 $1,413 17 
Flagstaff, AZ--UT MSA $6,117 35 $5,214 216 -$903 291 
Eugene--Springfield, OR MSA $6,110 36 $6,521 57 $411 82 
Duluth--Superior, MN--WI MSA $6,102 37 $7,138 20 $1,036 30 
Santa Fe, NM MSA $6,090 38 $6,627 52 $537 66 
Washington - Rural $6,083 39 $6,310 73 $227 107 
Grand Forks, ND--MN MSA $6,058 40 $6,937 31 $879 42 
Montana - Rural $6,055 41 $5,672 142 -$383 218 
New York--Northern New Jersey--Long Island, NY--NJ-
-CT--PA CMSA $6,053 42 $7,963 4 $1,910 6 
Rocky Mount, NC MSA $6,045 43 $6,423 67 $378 90 
Portland--Salem, OR--WA CMSA $6,019 44 $6,689 48 $670 59 
Detroit--Ann Arbor--Flint, MI CMSA $6,018 45 $6,420 68 $402 84 
Fort Collins--Loveland, CO MSA $6,017 46 $5,436 178 -$581 252 
Casper, WY MSA $6,006 47 $6,846 35 $840 45 
Nevada - Rural $6,001 48 $4,679 288 -$1,322 317 
Chicago--Gary--Kenosha, IL--IN--WI CMSA $5,992 49 $6,237 81 $245 105 
San Francisco--Oakland--San Jose, CA CMSA $5,989 50 $7,480 13 $1,491 15 
Springfield, MA MSA $5,980 51 $6,432 63 $452 75 
Oregon - Rural $5,975 52 $6,291 74 $316 97 
Miami--Fort Lauderdale, FL CMSA $5,959 53 $6,117 95 $158 116 
Washington--Baltimore, DC--MD--VA--WV CMSA $5,951 54 $6,431 64 $480 70 
Reno, NV MSA $5,951 55 $5,828 121 -$123 165 
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Name 
Hybrid Actual Difference 
Need Rank Need Rank Amount Rank 
Pueblo, CO MSA $5,950 56 $4,957 257 -$993 300 
Spokane, WA MSA $5,949 57 $5,778 128 -$171 173 
Bismarck, ND MSA $5,946 58 $5,741 132 -$205 181 
San Luis Obispo--Atascadero--Paso Robles, CA MSA $5,944 59 $6,194 84 $250 103 
Idaho - Rural $5,938 60 $4,969 254 -$969 298 
Indianapolis, IN MSA $5,922 61 $5,716 135 -$206 182 
Medford--Ashland, OR MSA $5,918 62 $5,911 116 -$7 140 
Portland, ME MSA $5,909 63 $5,967 111 $58 133 
Norfolk--Virginia Beach--Newport News, VA--NC 
MSA $5,902 64 $5,784 126 -$118 164 
Lawton, OK MSA $5,897 65 $5,469 175 -$428 227 
Corvallis, OR MSA $5,897 66 $6,050 103 $153 118 
Albuquerque, NM MSA $5,897 67 $6,151 88 $254 102 
Bangor, ME MSA $5,895 68 $5,835 120 -$60 150 
Green Bay, WI MSA $5,894 69 $6,964 28 $1,070 28 
West Palm Beach--Boca Raton, FL MSA $5,891 70 $5,738 134 -$153 168 
Cincinnati--Hamilton, OH--KY--IN CMSA $5,884 71 $5,744 131 -$140 167 
Lima, OH MSA $5,881 72 $5,372 190 -$509 239 
Omaha, NE--IA MSA $5,880 73 $5,628 155 -$252 195 
Iowa - Rural $5,879 74 $5,496 173 -$383 218 
Burlington, VT MSA $5,878 75 $6,065 99 $187 112 
Mansfield, OH MSA $5,878 76 $5,309 200 -$569 249 
Kalamazoo--Battle Creek, MI MSA $5,876 77 $5,652 150 -$224 187 
Las Vegas, NV--AZ MSA $5,876 78 $5,741 133 -$135 166 
Boise City, ID MSA $5,874 79 $5,059 242 -$815 281 
Janesville--Beloit, WI MSA $5,873 80 $6,312 72 $439 77 
Columbus, OH MSA $5,871 81 $6,191 85 $320 95 
Salinas, CA MSA $5,870 82 $7,491 12 $1,621 10 
Utica--Rome, NY MSA $5,865 83 $7,102 21 $1,237 22 
Bellingham, WA MSA $5,861 84 $5,799 124 -$62 151 
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Hybrid Actual Difference 
Need Rank Need Rank Amount Rank 
Michigan - Rural $5,861 85 $5,609 160 -$252 195 
Las Cruces, NM MSA $5,859 86 $6,010 107 $151 119 
Binghamton, NY MSA $5,859 87 $6,975 27 $1,116 25 
Kansas City, MO--KS MSA $5,858 88 $5,627 157 -$231 189 
Seattle--Tacoma--Bremerton, WA CMSA $5,858 89 $6,714 46 $856 44 
Jamestown, NY MSA $5,855 90 $7,714 9 $1,859 7 
Des Moines, IA MSA $5,853 91 $6,058 100 $205 111 
South Dakota - Rural $5,843 92 $4,923 262 -$920 293 
Kokomo, IN MSA $5,840 93 $5,244 209 -$596 256 
Davenport--Moline--Rock Island, IA--IL MSA $5,840 94 $5,506 172 -$334 206 
Lansing--East Lansing, MI MSA $5,837 95 $5,977 110 $140 121 
Elmira, NY MSA $5,833 96 $6,820 38 $987 34 
Enid, OK MSA $5,830 97 $4,575 301 -$1,255 313 
Yuma, AZ MSA $5,830 98 $4,642 295 -$1,188 311 
Cheyenne, WY MSA $5,826 99 $7,193 19 $1,367 18 
Florida - Rural $5,826 100 $4,431 311 -$1,395 319 
Philadelphia--Wilmington--Atlantic City, PA--NJ--DE--
MD CMSA $5,825 101 $6,530 56 $705 56 
Providence--Fall River--Warwick, RI--MA MSA $5,824 102 $6,864 34 $1,040 29 
Springfield, IL MSA $5,819 103 $5,296 203 -$523 241 
Tulsa, OK MSA $5,819 104 $5,256 205 -$563 246 
St. Louis, MO--IL MSA $5,811 105 $5,209 217 -$602 257 
Illinois - Rural $5,809 106 $4,997 252 -$812 280 
Alexandria, LA MSA $5,808 107 $5,195 223 -$613 258 
West Virginia - Rural $5,807 108 $5,310 199 -$497 238 
Rapid City, SD MSA $5,807 109 $5,288 204 -$519 240 
Sioux City, IA--NE MSA $5,806 110 $5,749 129 -$57 149 
Cleveland--Akron, OH CMSA $5,805 111 $6,276 77 $471 72 
Buffalo--Niagara Falls, NY MSA $5,804 112 $7,076 22 $1,272 20 
Grand Junction, CO MSA $5,787 113 $5,195 222 -$592 254 
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Hybrid Actual Difference 
Need Rank Need Rank Amount Rank 
Tucson, AZ MSA $5,780 114 $4,792 275 -$988 299 
Georgia - Rural $5,776 115 $5,520 170 -$256 197 
Saginaw--Bay City--Midland, MI MSA $5,771 116 $5,656 148 -$115 162 
Dayton--Springfield, OH MSA $5,766 117 $5,652 149 -$114 161 
Pittsburgh, PA MSA $5,765 118 $6,188 86 $423 80 
Joplin, MO MSA $5,765 119 $4,206 322 -$1,559 323 
Barnstable--Yarmouth, MA MSA $5,764 120 $6,665 50 $901 39 
Rockford, IL MSA $5,763 121 $5,513 171 -$250 193 
Great Falls, MT MSA $5,761 122 $5,230 213 -$531 243 
Memphis, TN--AR--MS MSA $5,757 123 $5,664 144 -$93 157 
Longview--Marshall, TX MSA $5,757 124 $4,653 294 -$1,104 307 
Columbia, SC MSA $5,757 125 $6,069 98 $312 98 
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA $5,756 126 $6,230 82 $474 71 
Odessa--Midland, TX MSA $5,755 127 $6,052 102 $297 99 
Glens Falls, NY MSA $5,753 128 $7,273 16 $1,520 11 
San Antonio, TX MSA $5,751 129 $5,326 198 -$425 226 
San Diego, CA MSA $5,750 130 $6,579 54 $829 46 
Lewiston--Auburn, ME MSA $5,749 131 $5,330 197 -$419 225 
Lincoln, NE MSA $5,743 132 $5,628 154 -$115 162 
Pine Bluff, AR MSA $5,741 133 $4,676 290 -$1,065 302 
Danville, VA MSA $5,737 134 $4,661 292 -$1,076 303 
Madison, WI MSA $5,736 135 $6,434 61 $698 57 
Oklahoma - Rural $5,736 136 $4,875 269 -$861 286 
Fargo--Moorhead, ND--MN MSA $5,732 137 $6,542 55 $810 48 
North Dakota - Rural $5,730 138 $5,564 163 -$166 172 
Peoria--Pekin, IL MSA $5,730 139 $5,113 235 -$617 259 
Greenville, NC MSA $5,729 140 $5,370 191 -$359 215 
Wausau, WI MSA $5,729 141 $6,469 60 $740 52 
Dallas--Fort Worth, TX CMSA $5,727 142 $5,379 187 -$348 211 
107 
 
Name 
Hybrid Actual Difference 
Need Rank Need Rank Amount Rank 
Topeka, KS MSA $5,727 143 $5,405 183 -$322 204 
Maryland - Rural $5,724 144 $5,806 123 $82 127 
Atlanta, GA MSA $5,723 145 $5,660 147 -$63 152 
Billings, MT MSA $5,722 146 $5,477 174 -$245 192 
Pocatello, ID MSA $5,722 147 $5,563 165 -$159 169 
Benton Harbor, MI MSA $5,719 148 $5,252 206 -$467 231 
Toledo, OH MSA $5,718 149 $5,784 125 $66 130 
Iowa City, IA MSA $5,713 150 $5,176 226 -$537 245 
Vermont - Rural $5,712 151 $6,030 105 $318 96 
Grand Rapids--Muskegon--Holland, MI MSA $5,708 152 $5,703 137 -$5 138 
Syracuse, NY MSA $5,708 153 $7,202 18 $1,494 14 
Macon, GA MSA $5,707 154 $6,718 45 $1,011 32 
Nebraska - Rural $5,706 155 $5,701 138 -$5 138 
Oklahoma City, OK MSA $5,706 156 $5,308 201 -$398 222 
Augusta--Aiken, GA--SC MSA $5,705 157 $5,061 241 -$644 262 
Panama City, FL MSA $5,700 158 $5,815 122 $115 124 
Maine - Rural $5,699 159 $5,609 159 -$90 156 
Wisconsin - Rural $5,698 160 $6,092 96 $394 86 
Wichita, KS MSA $5,696 161 $5,202 220 -$494 237 
Wilmington, NC MSA $5,692 162 $7,795 8 $2,103 5 
Boston--Worcester--Lawrence, MA--NH--ME--CT 
CMSA $5,690 163 $6,150 89 $460 73 
Muncie, IN MSA $5,689 164 $4,560 303 -$1,129 309 
Columbus, GA--AL MSA $5,689 165 $4,894 266 -$795 277 
Richmond--Petersburg, VA MSA $5,688 166 $5,374 189 -$314 202 
Abilene, TX MSA $5,686 167 $4,385 314 -$1,301 315 
St. Cloud, MN MSA $5,684 168 $6,390 70 $706 55 
Colorado Springs, CO MSA $5,678 169 $5,748 130 $70 128 
South Bend, IN MSA $5,675 170 $5,402 184 -$273 199 
Missoula, MT MSA $5,675 171 $5,152 230 -$523 241 
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Hybrid Actual Difference 
Need Rank Need Rank Amount Rank 
Cumberland, MD--WV MSA $5,675 172 $5,438 177 -$237 191 
Elkhart--Goshen, IN MSA $5,667 173 $4,924 261 -$743 270 
New York - Rural $5,665 174 $7,346 15 $1,681 9 
Roanoke, VA MSA $5,660 175 $5,173 227 -$487 236 
Wichita Falls, TX MSA $5,657 176 $4,309 318 -$1,348 318 
Pittsfield, MA MSA $5,656 177 $6,433 62 $777 50 
Kansas – Rural $5,654 178 $5,605 161 -$49 148 
Albany--Schenectady--Troy, NY MSA $5,649 179 $6,916 32 $1,267 21 
Albany, GA MSA $5,648 180 $6,023 106 $375 91 
Champaign--Urbana, IL MSA $5,644 181 $5,302 202 -$342 208 
Canton--Massillon, OH MSA $5,641 182 $5,047 245 -$594 255 
Charleston, WV MSA $5,635 183 $5,384 186 -$251 194 
Savannah, GA MSA $5,633 184 $5,663 145 $30 135 
Sheboygan, WI MSA $5,632 185 $6,211 83 $579 62 
Milwaukee--Racine, WI CMSA $5,630 186 $6,514 58 $884 41 
Beaumont--Port Arthur, TX MSA $5,627 187 $4,788 276 -$839 284 
Lakeland--Winter Haven, FL MSA $5,625 188 $4,431 310 -$1,194 312 
Amarillo, TX MSA $5,622 189 $4,689 284 -$933 296 
Decatur, IL MSA $5,620 190 $4,956 258 -$664 264 
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT MSA $5,619 191 $5,641 153 $22 136 
Corpus Christi, TX MSA $5,618 192 $4,921 263 -$697 269 
Pensacola, FL MSA $5,613 193 $4,684 287 -$929 295 
Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill, NC MSA $5,613 194 $5,450 176 -$163 171 
Eau Claire, WI MSA $5,609 195 $6,055 101 $446 76 
Johnstown, PA MSA $5,605 196 $5,251 207 -$354 213 
Waterloo--Cedar Falls, IA MSA $5,603 197 $5,564 164 -$39 146 
Evansville--Henderson, IN--KY MSA $5,602 198 $4,958 256 -$644 262 
Myrtle Beach, SC MSA $5,602 199 $6,686 49 $1,084 27 
Virginia - Rural $5,601 200 $4,284 320 -$1,317 316 
109 
 
Name 
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Youngstown--Warren, OH MSA $5,599 201 $5,014 249 -$585 253 
Dubuque, IA MSA $5,598 202 $5,379 188 -$219 186 
Phoenix--Mesa, AZ MSA $5,597 203 $5,166 228 -$431 228 
Biloxi--Gulfport--Pascagoula, MS MSA $5,597 204 $6,285 75 $688 58 
Nashville, TN MSA $5,595 205 $5,122 233 -$473 233 
Delaware - Rural $5,589 206 $6,588 53 $999 33 
Shreveport--Bossier City, LA MSA $5,587 207 $5,192 224 -$395 221 
Victoria, TX MSA $5,587 208 $6,075 97 $488 68 
Terre Haute, IN MSA $5,584 209 $4,487 309 -$1,097 305 
Huntington--Ashland, WV--KY--OH MSA $5,577 210 $5,231 212 -$346 209 
Lynchburg, VA MSA $5,575 211 $4,678 289 -$897 290 
Sharon, PA MSA $5,574 212 $5,134 231 -$440 229 
San Angelo, TX MSA $5,569 213 $4,096 323 -$1,473 321 
Dover, DE MSA $5,567 214 $6,765 39 $1,198 23 
Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock Hill, NC--SC MSA $5,566 215 $6,281 76 $715 53 
Fort Wayne, IN MSA $5,562 216 $4,869 270 -$693 268 
Jacksonville, FL MSA $5,560 217 $5,086 239 -$474 234 
Lake Charles, LA MSA $5,559 218 $5,680 140 $121 122 
Indiana - Rural $5,551 219 $4,878 268 -$673 266 
Bloomington--Normal, IL MSA $5,545 220 $5,521 169 -$24 143 
Springfield, MO MSA $5,541 221 $4,777 277 -$764 273 
New Hampshire - Rural $5,539 222 $5,347 193 -$192 177 
St. Joseph, MO MSA $5,538 223 $4,686 286 -$852 285 
Jackson, TN MSA $5,537 224 $7,947 6 $2,410 4 
Santa Barbara--Santa Maria--Lompoc, CA MSA $5,530 225 $7,044 23 $1,514 13 
Charleston--North Charleston, SC MSA $5,530 226 $5,932 114 $402 84 
Pennsylvania - Rural $5,527 227 $4,960 255 -$567 248 
Reading, PA MSA $5,522 228 $5,869 119 $347 93 
Austin--San Marcos, TX MSA $5,522 229 $5,426 181 -$96 158 
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Denver--Boulder--Greeley, CO CMSA $5,521 230 $6,265 79 $744 51 
Clarksville--Hopkinsville, TN--KY MSA $5,518 231 $4,694 282 -$824 282 
Ohio - Rural $5,518 232 $5,332 196 -$186 176 
Killeen--Temple, TX MSA $5,514 233 $4,640 297 -$874 289 
Melbourne--Titusville--Palm Bay, FL MSA $5,512 234 $4,744 278 -$768 274 
Missouri - Rural $5,511 235 $4,390 312 -$1,121 308 
Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA $5,509 236 $4,605 299 -$904 292 
Sherman--Denison, TX MSA $5,507 237 $4,642 296 -$865 288 
Chattanooga, TN--GA MSA $5,505 238 $5,661 146 $156 117 
La Crosse, WI--MN MSA $5,503 239 $6,410 69 $907 38 
Fort Pierce--Port St. Lucie, FL MSA $5,498 240 $4,823 273 -$675 267 
Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah, WI MSA $5,496 241 $5,979 108 $483 69 
Williamsport, PA MSA $5,495 242 $5,428 180 -$67 153 
Harrisburg--Lebanon--Carlisle, PA MSA $5,489 243 $5,922 115 $433 79 
Fort Smith, AR--OK MSA $5,486 244 $4,816 274 -$670 265 
Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton, PA MSA $5,483 245 $5,977 109 $494 67 
Decatur, AL MSA $5,482 246 $5,551 167 $69 129 
Louisville, KY--IN MSA $5,477 247 $5,650 151 $173 113 
Johnson City--Kingsport--Bristol, TN--VA MSA $5,469 248 $4,370 316 -$1,099 306 
Charlottesville, VA MSA $5,467 249 $4,712 280 -$755 272 
Parkersburg--Marietta, WV--OH MSA $5,457 250 $5,070 240 -$387 220 
Tampa--St. Petersburg--Clearwater, FL MSA $5,452 251 $4,993 253 -$459 230 
Houston--Galveston--Brazoria, TX CMSA $5,451 252 $5,664 143 $213 110 
Fayetteville, NC MSA $5,445 253 $5,902 117 $457 74 
Naples, FL MSA $5,444 254 $5,244 210 -$200 180 
State College, PA MSA $5,444 255 $4,489 308 -$955 297 
Jacksonville, NC MSA $5,443 256 $4,357 317 -$1,086 304 
Lubbock, TX MSA $5,439 257 $5,208 219 -$231 189 
Erie, PA MSA $5,437 258 $5,548 168 $111 125 
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Altoona, PA MSA $5,437 259 $4,655 293 -$782 276 
Knoxville, TN MSA $5,437 260 $4,858 271 -$579 251 
Kentucky - Rural $5,436 261 $5,122 232 -$314 202 
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC MSA $5,427 262 $5,018 248 -$409 224 
Orlando, FL MSA $5,424 263 $5,596 162 $172 114 
Monroe, LA MSA $5,423 264 $5,700 139 $277 100 
Asheville, NC MSA $5,421 265 $5,228 215 -$193 178 
Lancaster, PA MSA $5,416 266 $5,209 218 -$207 183 
Texarkana, TX--Texarkana, AR MSA $5,416 267 $4,583 300 -$833 283 
Baton Rouge, LA MSA $5,415 268 $5,057 243 -$358 214 
Sarasota--Bradenton, FL MSA $5,411 269 $5,627 156 $216 108 
North Carolina - Rural $5,409 270 $5,200 221 -$209 184 
Jackson, MI MSA $5,407 271 $5,643 152 $236 106 
Columbia, MO MSA $5,406 272 $5,008 251 -$398 222 
Birmingham, AL MSA $5,406 273 $5,966 112 $560 64 
Tallahassee, FL MSA $5,398 274 $5,049 244 -$349 212 
Arkansas - Rural $5,395 275 $4,532 305 -$863 287 
Jackson, MS MSA $5,389 276 $5,110 237 -$279 200 
Lawrence, KS MSA $5,376 277 $5,415 182 $39 134 
Sioux Falls, SD MSA $5,374 278 $5,028 247 -$346 209 
Owensboro, KY MSA $5,373 279 $5,622 158 $249 104 
Provo--Orem, UT MSA $5,370 280 $5,350 192 -$20 142 
Lexington, KY MSA $5,369 281 $5,345 194 -$24 143 
Gainesville, FL MSA $5,361 282 $4,724 279 -$637 261 
New Orleans, LA MSA $5,356 283 $5,677 141 $321 94 
Ocala, FL MSA $5,351 284 $4,216 321 -$1,135 310 
South Carolina - Rural $5,342 285 $5,779 127 $437 78 
Fayetteville--Springdale--Rogers, AR MSA $5,330 286 $4,850 272 -$480 235 
Waco, TX MSA $5,323 287 $5,713 136 $390 88 
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Fort Myers--Cape Coral, FL MSA $5,321 288 $6,137 90 $816 47 
Punta Gorda, FL MSA $5,318 289 $4,546 304 -$772 275 
Texas - Rural $5,315 290 $4,698 281 -$617 259 
Huntsville, AL MSA $5,311 291 $6,245 80 $934 35 
Wheeling, WV--OH MSA $5,310 292 $5,111 236 -$199 179 
Tennessee - Rural $5,303 293 $4,305 319 -$998 301 
Steubenville--Weirton, OH--WV MSA $5,301 294 $4,935 259 -$366 217 
Lafayette, IN MSA $5,300 295 $4,501 307 -$799 278 
Hattiesburg, MS MSA $5,300 296 $6,723 43 $1,423 16 
Little Rock--North Little Rock, AR MSA $5,292 297 $5,114 234 -$178 175 
Jonesboro, AR MSA $5,266 298 $4,932 260 -$334 206 
Daytona Beach, FL MSA $5,264 299 $5,178 225 -$86 155 
Mobile, AL MSA $5,260 300 $5,229 214 -$31 145 
Greenville--Spartanburg--Anderson, SC MSA $5,259 301 $6,121 94 $862 43 
Tuscaloosa, AL MSA $5,259 302 $6,953 29 $1,694 8 
Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir, NC MSA $5,258 303 $5,154 229 -$104 160 
Sumter, SC MSA $5,232 304 $5,008 250 -$224 187 
Florence, SC MSA $5,232 305 $5,394 185 $162 115 
York, PA MSA $5,216 306 $5,430 179 $214 109 
Bloomington, IN MSA $5,215 307 $4,885 267 -$330 205 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA MSA $5,212 308 $5,038 246 -$174 174 
Tyler, TX MSA $5,190 309 $4,382 315 -$808 279 
Goldsboro, NC MSA $5,181 310 $4,916 265 -$265 198 
Gadsden, AL MSA $5,165 311 $4,633 298 -$532 244 
Anniston, AL MSA $5,147 312 $5,560 166 $413 81 
Florence, AL MSA $5,130 313 $6,045 104 $915 37 
Louisiana - Rural $5,128 314 $4,919 264 -$209 184 
Athens, GA MSA $5,108 315 $6,126 92 $1,018 31 
Alabama - Rural $5,094 316 $4,528 306 -$566 247 
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Name 
Hybrid Actual Difference 
Need Rank Need Rank Amount Rank 
Dothan, AL MSA $5,084 317 $6,428 65 $1,344 19 
Montgomery, AL MSA $5,044 318 $4,575 302 -$469 232 
Mississippi – Rural $5,042 319 $5,104 238 $62 131 
Houma, LA MSA $5,024 320 $6,132 91 $1,108 26 
Lafayette, LA MSA $4,991 321 $4,693 283 -$298 201 
Bryan--College Station, TX MSA $4,963 322 $4,388 313 -$575 250 
Auburn--Opelika, AL MSA $4,682 323 $4,686 285 $4 137 
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Appendix E. Workload and Expenditure Need Calculations Under the ACIR Approach 
The ACIR method requires demographic data at the state level for all states. In 
particular, the following data are required: 
From the U.S. Census Bureau: 
• Total population 
• Population age cohorts: 
o 5 and 13 
o 14 - 17 
o 18 - 24 
o 25 - 34 
o 34 and over 
• Private school attendance 
• K-8 
• 9-12 (High School)  
• Population living in poverty 
• Population living below 1.5 times poverty line 
• Population under 18 living in poverty 
• Population between 16-64 with work disability 
 
From the Federal Highway Administration: 
• Vehicle miles traveled 
• Lane-miles of streets and road 
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From the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports: 
• Number of murders and non-negligent manslaughters 
 
Because the workloads are the basic factor by which the RES apportions national 
expenditures by expenditure category and state, these statistics provide the main variation 
in expenditures. In particular, because expenditure need is presented in per-capita terms, 
and because poverty, population by age, and crime make up such a large portion of the 
workloads, the RES method largely provides a measure of poverty, youth, and the murder 
rate. The workloads are determined for seven different categories of expenditure: (1) 
elementary and secondary education, (2) higher education, (3) public welfare, (4) health 
and hospitals, (5) highways, (6) police and corrections, and (7) all other expenditures. 
The ACIR report places weights on demographic statistics in calculating the 
workloads for each of these categories of expenditures, but does not present these weights 
clearly. The following equations are adjusted so that in every case, the sum of workloads 
across states equals one.
23 
              
     
           
 
     
            
         
      
          
 
      
           
           
        
 
        
     
              
      
 
      
          
      
 
      
          
      
 
      
          
    
 
    
     
                                                 
23
 Note: these workloads will not match exactly the ones used in either the ACIR study or the GAO study 
(which are unreported), because neither study explicitly normalizes the workloads. Nonetheless, these 
equations are just normalized versions of the ACIR workloads, and the results that arise are comparable to 
those reported in the ACIR study. 
 In these equations, superscript ―i‖ indexes states, and ―US‖ refers to the national total. Numerical 
subscripts refer to age ranges and the subscripts ―K-8‖ and ―HS‖ refer to school grade. the rest of the 
abbreviations are as follows: ESeduc = Elementary and Secondary education workload; HIeduc = Higher 
education workload; pubwelf = Public welfare workload; highways = Highways workload; police = Police 
and Corrections workload; allother = All other expenditures workload; p = population; prvsch = private 
school enrollment; ppvty (1.5*pvrty) = population living below (1.5 times) the poverty line; pwrkdsabl = 
population with work disabilities; VMT = vehicle miles traveled; lanemiles = lane-miles of road and 
highway; murders = # of murders. 
116 
 
         
      
       
  
        
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
              
 
             
    
 
 
 
             
 
             
     
                
    
     
        
          
           
   
        
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
      
 
      
    
 
 
 
        
         
   
          
  
   
  
In the ACIR and GAO studies, these workloads are adjusted for variations in the 
cost of labor inputs across states and variations of the relative importance of labor inputs 
across categories of expenditure. Thus, there is a matrix of input-cost indices across states 
and categories of expenditure that modifies the representative expenditure level.
24
  
The ACIR study combined data on the mean annual earnings of 45-64 year-old 
males who worked 40 or more weeks in 1979, by years of educational attainment, across 
states, with data on the portion of national expenditure by category attributable to payroll. 
                                                 
24
 An example of such a matrix is available in Tannenwald and Turner (2004) pp. 87-90. 
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Appendix F: Proofs of Results in ―Evading Nash Traps in Two-Player Simultaneous 
Games‖ 
 
Result 1: Every strict Nash equilibrium profile is détente strategic. 
 
Given that          is a SNE,  
     
       
                     
       Def. of SNE 
        
       is unique Def. of best response 
       
      is unique Def. of counter-response 
       
    
        Substitution 
                
          
    
           Substitution 
                    
          
    
           Def. of function 
          is DS Def. of DS 
 
Result 2: Every no-initiative strategic profile is a détente strategic profile. 
 
A strategy profile is no-initiative strategic if there exists no alternative strategy   
  
for any player such that the counter-response to the modified strategy profile    
       
provides a greater payoff to the player. The détente concept requires that this be true only 
of alternative strategies that are themselves best-responses to a given set of opponents’ 
strategies: 
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Given that          is NIS, 
     
         
                       Def. of NIS 
   
          
    
              
      Def. of initiative-response set 
                    
          
    
          Substitution 
          is a DE Def. of DS 
 
Result 3a: There are profiles that are DS but neither NE nor NIS. 
 
Given that         is DS, 
               
        
    
        Def. of DS 
               
    
    
      
    
    Def. of DS 
Assume   
        
       
    
     
     
     
                     
    
           is not NE, but is DS. 
Assume    
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         is not NIS. 
 
Result 3b: There are profiles that are NE but not NIS, and profiles that are NIS 
but not NE. 
 
Given that         is NE, 
Assume    
     
        
     
    
                    
     
    
                
     
                    
    
      
     
         is not NIS. 
 
Given that         is NIS, 
               
    
     
      
      Def. of NIS 
Assume    
        
        
     
    
    
        
                   
     
            is NIS, but not NE. 
 
Result 4: In any 2x2 game with both a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profile and 
a détente strategic profile, at least one player weakly prefers the détente strategic profile 
to some pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profile. For purposes of the proof, Figure 21 
presents a general form for a 2x2 normal-form game. 
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 L R 
U                 
D                 
Figure 21. General normal-form 2x2 game. 
 
Assume (D, R) is a DE profile: 
Assume there is a pure-strategy NE profile. 
Case 1:     
         
    , meaning (D, R) is both DE and a NE. Clearly, 
               . 
Case 2:     
         
    , making (D, L) a NE 
    
         
         Definition of Nash 
             
    
        
         Definition of DE 
                     Substitution 
Case 3:     
         
    , meaning (U, L) is a NE. 
    
         
         Definition of Nash 
3a: (U, L) is a SNE  (U, L) is a DE.   Result 1 
3b: (U, L) is a weak NE and not DE. Assume 
                    
      
and                     
    .  
Either 
3b1:              
    
        
      for some détente alternative profile 
                 is false by identity 
                is false by assumption 
3b1’:     
                         
OR 
3b2:              
       
    
       for some détente alternative profile 
121 
 
                is false by identity 
3b2’:                 
                                Assumption, transitivity 
     
      
But              
       
    
                       
      =        
Therefore                 . 
 
Result 5: In any 2-player game with both a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profile 
and a no-initiative strategic profile, both players weakly prefer the no-initiative strategic 
profile to all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profiles. 
 
Assume         is a NIS profile, and assume there is a pure-strategy NE:    
     
     . 
Player 1: 
               
    
    
       
      Def. of NIS 
               
     
    
       Substitution 
               
     
      Def. of best response 
Player 2: 
               
    
     
      
      Def. of NIS 
               
    
      
      Substitution 
               
     
      Def. of best response 
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